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365 
TRANSNATIONAL TRIALS AS TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL OF  
TWO RWANDAN NUNS IN BELGIUM 
MAX L. RETTIG

 
I’m convinced that [Srs. Gertrude and Kizito] were convicted as 
cowards, more than as killers. They were scared like hell. They did 
not help people to avoid being killed themselves. 
Gilles Vanderbeck, Co-Counsel for Sr. Kizito  
(September 2009) 
It’s so complicated for us as Europeans to recognize when [a 
Rwandan] is not telling the truth. 
Serge Wahis, Co-Counsel for Sr. Kizito  
(September 2009) 
The trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito should have taken place here 
in Rwanda. It is here that they committed these crimes. 
Female farmer from Sovu  
(May 2007) 
ABSTRACT 
More than a decade after the landmark trial of two Rwandan nuns for 
their role in the 1994 genocide, important lessons from the proceedings 
have yet to be fully explored. While scholars have vigorously debated the 
merits of international tribunals, hybrid courts, and local justice, 
comparatively little attention has focused on transnational trials—when 
national courts, typically in Europe and North America, exercise 
jurisdiction over foreign persons for crimes allegedly committed in foreign 
countries. Drawing on evidence collected in Belgium and Rwanda, 
including interviews, trial transcripts, and public opinion data, this Article 
uses the trial of the two Rwandan nuns to evaluate the strengths and 
 
 
  The author conducted ten months of field work in Rwanda as a Fulbright Scholar and 
additional research in Belgium and Rwanda. Currently an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal 
Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, the author also teaches ―International Transitional Justice‖ at 
the Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed in this Article do not necessarily 
represent the views of the U.S. Government or the U.S. Department of State. The author wishes to 
thank Professor Allen Weiner for his support for this project. 
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weaknesses of transnational trials. The story of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito 
provides an example of how Belgium’s exercise of jurisdiction prevented 
two accused génocidaires from escaping the law’s reach. But their story 
also reveals the challenges associated with conducting a highly sensitive 
trial in a culturally and geographically distant land. Defense attorneys for 
the nuns argue that Belgian jurors were ill-equipped to sort truth from 
fiction because of their lack of familiarity with Rwandan culture. The 
Belgian government’s reluctance to grant a key witness a visa to testify at 
trial deprived the jury of the opportunity to hear and assess his testimony. 
Furthermore, public opinion data reveals that the trial failed to capture 
the attention of the Rwandan people, perhaps detracting from the trial’s 
capacity to promote norm penetration and reconciliation. The trial also 
implicitly privileged Belgian legal values, like due process and relatively 
light sentences, over Rwanda’s preference for harsher punishments. 
Before fully embracing universal jurisdiction and transnational trials, 
policymakers must carefully consider the goals they aim to achieve by 
prosecuting foreign citizens for crimes committed abroad. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The neatly manicured grounds of the monastic compound of Sovu, in 
southern Rwanda, belie the horror of what happened there. Just beyond the 
monastery‘s gates lies a mass grave, the final resting place for as many as 
8000 men, women, and children who were murdered outside the 
monastery during the 1994 genocide. Today, as before, some thirty 
Benedictine nuns live in the monastery, and members of the community 
pray in the monastery‘s chapel on Sundays. In 1994, Sr. Gertrude, the 
mother superior, and Sr. Maria Kizito, a novice, were among the nuns 
living there. As the rebel army advanced, they first fled to Zaire with their 
flock, and then to a Benedictine convent one hour outside of Brussels. 
They lived quietly in Belgium with other Rwandan and European nuns 
until the Belgian media published a shocking accusation: these women of 
God collaborated with local genocide leaders, provided the gasoline used 
to burn hundreds of Tutsi alive, drove over the bodies of the dying, and 
cast out refugees who had been hiding in the monastery, knowing they 
would be slaughtered. In April 2001, seven years to the day after refugees 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
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began to seek safety inside the monastery, the trial of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito commenced.
1
 
The circumstances of the nuns‘ trial were as extraordinary as the 
crimes of which they were accused. The trial did not take place in Sovu, 
where the crimes were committed. Nor did it take place in Tanzania, 
where the UN-sponsored international tribunal is headquartered. Rather, it 
was held four thousand miles away in Belgium, on the soil of Rwanda‘s 
former colonial master.
2
 The trial was groundbreaking for reasons other 
than venue too. It was the first trial where a jury of laypersons was asked 
to hear evidence of international humanitarian law violations allegedly 
committed by a foreign national on the territory of a foreign state.
3
 It was 
the first trial under Belgium‘s pioneering, controversial, and now-defunct 
universal jurisdiction law.
4
 And it was among the first of a growing 
number of transnational trials to focus on the 1994 genocide.
5
 
Now more than a decade after the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, 
important lessons from the proceedings have yet to be fully explored.
6
 
These lessons remain relevant today because transnational trials have 
become a prominent feature of the international criminal justice landscape. 
Prosecutors in a number of countries, including Belgium, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, have focused on 
individuals who allegedly committed atrocities abroad.
7
 As of 2001, 125 
countries had universal jurisdiction laws on the books for one or more 
crimes.
8
 Even the United States, once an outspoken foe of universal 
 
 
 1. Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were tried with two men from Butare, the major city near Sovu. 
Although joined for the purposes of trial, their cases were not factually related. 
 2. See Assize Court of Brussels, verdict of 8 June 2001. 
 3. Linda Keller, Belgian Jury to Decide Case Concerning Rwandan Genocide, AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (May 2001), http://www.asil.org/insigh72.cfm. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. The most in-depth treatments of the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito are LAURE DE VULPIAN, 
RWANDA, UN GENOCIDE OUBLIÉ? UN PROCÈS POUR MÉMOIRE (Belgium: Éditions Complexe 2004) and 
Luc Reydams, Belgium’s First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case, 1 J. INT‘L 
CRIM. JUST. 428 (2003). 
 7. The European Court of Human Rights‘ recent decision in Ahorugeze v. Sweden, in which a 
Rwandan national attempted to block his extradition from Sweden to Rwanda—discusses a number of 
transnational trials for individuals suspected of having participated in the 1994 genocide. See 
Ahorugeze v. Sweden (No. 37075/09), HUDOC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-107183. Máximo Langer‘s study of universal jurisdiction found that eighty-
seven complaints were filed against Rwandans under universal jurisdiction laws, while eleven 
Rwandans had been brought to trial. See Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: 
The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT‘L 
L. 1, 8, tbl. 1. 
 8. AMNESTY INT‘L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE 
LEGISLATION 4 (2001), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/002/2001/en/be 2d6765-d8f0-
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
368 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:365 
 
 
 
 
jurisdiction, has enacted universal jurisdiction laws for genocide,
9
 
recruiting child soldiers,
10
 and terrorism.
11
 These statutes give prosecutors 
broad power to indict persons suspected of committing atrocities abroad, 
irrespective of the accused‘s nationality.12 
Although Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were living in Belgium at the time 
they faced trial, neither was a Belgian citizen, and the crimes they were 
accused of committing took place in Rwanda against Rwandan victims. To 
establish jurisdiction to prosecute the Sisters, Belgium relied in part on the 
1993 Act Concerning Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian 
Law.
13
 The law, as amended in 1999, gave Belgian courts jurisdiction over 
cases involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
regardless of the nationality of the accused, the nationality of the victim, 
the place the criminal act was committed, and the presence of the accused 
on Belgian territory.
14 Under Belgium‘s constitution de partie-civile 
system, victims were empowered to act as plaintiff-prosecutors by 
requesting that an investigative judge open an inquiry. Furthermore, 
though not relevant to the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, the law 
dispensed with international law immunity for heads of state.
15
 In sum, the 
 
 
11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/ior530022001en.pdf. 
 9. Genocide Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2010). 
 10. Child Soldiers Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2010). 
 11. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B)(d) (2004). 
 12. The UN-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal, Rwanda‘s domestic courts, and the 
quasi-traditional, quasi-local tribunals known as gacaca account for the vast majority prosecutions for 
the genocide. For an overview of the gacaca courts, see Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity? 
Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2006), and PHILLIP CLARK, THE 
GACACA COURTS, POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT 
LAWYERS (Cambridge 2010).  
 13. Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des infractions grave aux Conventions 
internationales de Genève du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977, additionnels à ces 
Conventions [Law Concerning Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law], June 8, 1993, 
MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 5, 1993. For an overview of the ―life 
and death‖ of Belgium‘s universal jurisdiction statute, see Steven Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes 
Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 888, 888–97 (2003). See also Kenneth Roth, The Case for 
Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 150, 150 (2001). 
 14. Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative à la répression des infractions grave aux Conventions 
internationales de Genève du 12 août 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977, additionnels à ces 
Conventions [Law Concerning Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law], June 8, 1993, 
MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 5, 1993, amended by Loi relative à la 
répression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Law Concerning Grave Breaches 
International Humanitarian Law] Feb. 10, 1999, Art. 2, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of 
Belgium], Mar. 23, 1999, 9267. See also Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Belgian Law 
concerning The Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law: A Contested Law 
with Uncontested Objectives, AM. SOC‘Y OF INT‘L L. (2003), available at http://www.asil.org/insigh 
112.cfm#_edn2. 
 15. Loi relative à la répression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Law 
Concerning Grave Breaches International Humanitarian Law], Feb. 10, 1999, art. 2, Moniteur Belge 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
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law was among the broadest, most progressive jurisdictional laws ever 
enacted anywhere in the world. It was also highly controversial.  
What is universal jurisdiction, and why is it controversial? There are 
several bases for jurisdiction, including the exercise of jurisdiction over a 
state‘s own nationals (―nationality‖); over foreign nationals when the 
victim is a national of the state (―passive nationality‖); over foreign 
nationals when the conduct took place on the state‘s territory (―subjective 
territoriality‖); and over foreign nationals when the conduct ―has or is 
intended to have substantial effect‖ within the state (―objective 
territoriality‖).16 Under international law, the exercise of jurisdiction, no 
matter the ground, must always be reasonable.
17
 Universal jurisdiction 
breaks with tradition by permitting states to exercise jurisdiction even 
when none of these traditional bases of jurisdiction is met.
18
 Hervé 
Ascensio defines universal jurisdiction as a ground of jurisdiction that 
―does not require any link or nexus with the elected forum.‖19 Luc 
Reydams defines it in the negative: ―universal jurisdiction means that 
there is no link of territoriality or nationality between the State and the 
conduct or offender, nor is the State seeking to protect its security or 
credit.‖20 Prominent scholars and policymakers argue that universal 
jurisdiction statutes leave excessive discretion in the hands of 
unaccountable foreign prosecutors and judges.
21
 By contrast, advocates 
contend that universal jurisdiction is necessary to combat impunity.
22
  
 
 
[Official Gazzette of Belgium] [M.B.], Mar. 23, 1999, 9267. 
 16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 401–03; see 
also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299–303 (6th ed. 2003). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403. 
 18. For an overview of universal jurisdiction, see generally Roger O‘Keefe, Universal 
Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 735, 735–60 (2004). 
 19. Hervé Ascensio, Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The Supreme 
Tribunal’s Decision in Guatemalan Generals, 1 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 690, 699 (2003) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 20. LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 25 (2003). 
 21. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 86, 94 
(2001); Eric Posner, Garzon and the Trouble with International Law, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303828304575179891513981922.html; John Bolton, 
Democracy Under Arrest: ‘Universal’ Human-Rights Law Never Seems to Apply to the Likes of Kim 
Jong Il, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870439830 
4574597913245752256.html.  
 22. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 13, at 150. Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, 
argues:  
With growing frequency, national courts operating under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction 
are prosecuting despots in their custody for atrocities committed abroad. Impunity may still 
be the norm in many domestic courts, but international justice is an increasingly viable 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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But the intense debate over whether universal jurisdiction is legitimate 
fails to address an equally fundamental question: whether transnational 
trials are an effective response to mass atrocity.
23
 The story of Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito offers several important insights that help answer this 
question. Belgium‘s exercise of universal jurisdiction prevented two 
accused génocidaires from escaping the law‘s reach, and the trial also 
afforded the Sisters the procedural protections prized by western criminal 
justice systems. But their story also reveals the challenges associated with 
conducting a highly sensitive trial in a culturally and geographically 
distant land. Defense attorneys for the nuns argue that Belgian jurors were 
ill-equipped to sort truth from fiction because of their unfamiliarity with 
Rwandan culture. Because of immigration restrictions, the Belgian 
government would not allow their chief accuser and alleged collaborator to 
enter the country to testify; as a result, the jury was deprived of the 
opportunity to hear and assess important testimony. Furthermore, public 
opinion data reveals that the trial failed to capture the attention of the 
Rwandan people, perhaps detracting from the capacity of the trial to 
promote norm penetration and reconciliation.
24
 Finally, the trial implicitly 
privileged Belgium‘s legal values, such as due process and relatively light 
sentences, over Rwanda‘s preference for harsher punishments. In sum, the 
trial exposes both the merits and the demerits of prosecuting foreign 
nationals for crimes committed abroad through the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.  
This Article evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of transnational 
trials as a form of transitional justice, using the trial of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito as a case study. Part II describes the methodology underlying this 
study. Part III sets the historical backdrop for the trial of the Rwandan 
nuns, including a brief description of Rwanda‘s relationship with Belgium 
and the Catholic Church and an account of how the genocide was 
perpetrated in Sovu. Part IV examines the saga of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito, focusing on the dynamics of the trial and several evidentiary 
 
 
option, promising a measure of solace to victims and their families and raising the possibility 
that would-be tyrants will begin to think twice before embarking on a barbarous path. 
Id. 
 23. In the case of Belgium‘s universal jurisdiction statute, the critics won out. After the trial of 
Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, investigations were launched against such figures as Ariel Sharon and Yasser 
Arafat, as well as high-ranking American officials in connection with the 1991 Gulf War, including 
Norman Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and George H.W. Bush. In response, the United 
States threatened to relocate NATO headquarters from Brussels. Belgium quickly capitulated, 
dramatically curtailing the law‘s reach. Ratner, supra note 13, at 890–91. 
 24. See discussion infra Part V.B.3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
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problems that arose. Finally, Part V assesses whether and how 
transnational trials promote the numerous and sometimes competing 
objectives of transitional justice. This Article demonstrates that, while 
transnational prosecutions aid in the fight against impunity and tend to 
provide robust due process protections, they are hampered by logistical 
challenges, they inherently privilege western legal values, and they have 
limited impact on the affected community. 
II. FIELDWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
To understand the dynamics of the trial and its impact among Sovu 
residents, this Article draws from both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence collected in Rwanda and Belgium. Lawyers and a judge involved 
in the trial contributed their insight on all phases of the case, from the 
investigation to the final verdict and beyond. In September 2009, three of 
the four defense attorneys for Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were interviewed 
for this Article. In September 2010, the juge d’instruction or investigative 
judge who conducts the investigative proceedings, Damien 
Vandermeersch, was interviewed. Despite several requests through their 
attorneys, Srs. Gertrude and Kizito declined interviews.
25
 
Evidence collected during ten months of fieldwork in Sovu in 2006 
and 2007 and during a subsequent round of fieldwork in 2010 illuminates 
how Sovu residents view the trial. A team of trained and supervised 
Rwandan researchers administered three public opinion surveys in Sovu, 
the first in November and December of 2006, the second in May 2007, and 
the third in September 2010.
26
 These surveys included both open and 
closed questions to provide context for the numbers.  
 
 
 25. Serge Wahis stated, ―Understand that the Sisters must use discretion as their [immigration] 
status [in Belgium] has not yet been regularized.‖ Email from Serge Wahis, Attorney for Sr. Kizito, to 
author, Sept. 7, 2010 (on file with author) (author‘s translation from French). 
 26. A team of trained Rwandan research assistants administered 250 survey questionnaires in 
November to December 2006, 255 in May 2007, and 177 in September 2010. According to census 
figures obtained by my research team from the Huye Sector office in September 2006, 2879 people in 
Sovu are at least eighteen years old. According to census figures provided by local officials in 
September 2010, 2312 people in Sovu are at least eighteen years old; officials were not able to provide 
the number of people who were at least twenty-one years old. All three surveys have a 95% confidence 
interval. The first two surveys have a sampling error of 5.9%, while the third survey has a sampling 
error of 7.21% (the rate was calculated based on the population of Sovu residents who were at least 
eighteen years old). The response distribution for all three surveys is set at 50%. The respondents were 
not selected at random because of the challenges that such a method would entail. For example, it 
would have been exceptionally difficult to locate an individual by name, and relying on the authorities 
to identify selected individuals could have distorted responses because of the perception that the 
Rwandan government requires adherence to its point of view. Instead, we administered a household 
survey, selecting one person in every other house in the community as the survey respondent. In the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To collect a representative sample, the research team interviewed 
residents of all geographic areas of the community. Geographic 
distribution was important to ensure that the data captured a cross-section 
of individuals.
27
 These surveys probed local attitudes toward the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (―ICTR‖) in Arusha, Tanzani-
a; Rwanda‘s domestic military and civilian courts; the gacaca courts, 
which have heard the vast majority of genocide prosecutions; and the trial 
of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito. The surveys also measured public opinion on 
reconciliation, poverty, interethnic relations, and other social conditions in 
Sovu. The target population for all three surveys is defined as Sovu 
residents who were at least eighteen years old in 2006 and 2007. The 
target population was defined this way because the law governing gacaca 
permits persons eighteen and older to attend.
28
 Thus, this group is more 
likely to have been engaged in the gacaca proceedings and is better 
equipped to make comparisons between gacaca and other types of trials 
 
 
first survey, we selected the survey respondent based on the inhabitants‘ date of birth (we chose the 
individual whose birth date fell closest to the date of the interview). This method proved cumbersome 
and time-consuming because Sovu residents were not always sure of their date of birth. For surveys 
two and three, we chose instead to select the survey respondent in the household whose Christian name 
came first in alphabetical order (Rwandans typically have a Christian name and a Kinyarwanda name, 
neither of which is a ―family‖ name). In the first survey less than 1% of total interviewees refused to 
participate; just over 1% of total interviewees stopped the interview early because of emotional stress. 
In the second survey, 3% of total interviewees refused to participate or could not be located; less than 
1% of total interviewees stopped the interview early, this time because they felt uncomfortable 
answering questions about ethnicity without express permission from local authorities. In the third 
survey, one person refused to participate and an interviewer skipped one section of the survey on one 
occasion out of concern for the participant‘s emotional well-being. However, 107 completed 
questionnaires have been excluded from the survey data because of concerns about their authenticity. 
Thus, while 278 surveys were conducted, 171 are included in the data. The survey respondent‘s name 
and place of residence were not recorded on the survey itself or anywhere else. Some survey questions 
were based on those administered by Longman, Pham, and Weinstein. For the results of that study, see 
Tim Longman, Phuong Pham & Harvey Weinstein, Connecting Justice to Human Experience, in MY 
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 206–25 
(Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004). 
 27. For example, observations in Sovu revealed that many genocide survivors and returnees live 
in a government-built cluster of houses known as an umudugudu; in other areas, there are very few 
survivors. In addition, wealthier families tend to live near the sole paved road that passes Sovu, 
whereas poorer families tend to live in more remote areas. Despite the fact that 107 questionnaires 
have been excluded from the data for the third survey, the 171 surveys that are included in the data still 
reflect a broad geographic distribution of survey respondents, including households within the 
umudugudu and in the rest of the community.  
 28. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004, art. 6, available at http://www.inkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlaw1.pdf (establishing the organization, competence and functioning of gacaca 
Courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide and other crimes 
against humanity, committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
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than the younger population.
29
 All interviews were anonymous. The 
interviewee‘s name and place of residence were not recorded to help 
ensure anonymity. 
In-depth interviews and trial transcripts supplement the survey data. 
In 2007, I visited Karubanda Prison, a few kilometers from Sovu, where I 
interviewed Adjutant-Chef Emmanuel Rekeraho and Corporal Jean-
Baptiste Kamanayo. Rekeraho and Kamanayo, as Part III details, were the 
principal orchestrators of the genocide in Sovu, and they allegedly worked 
closely with Srs. Gertrude and Kizito during the genocide. Rekeraho‘s out-
of-court statements formed an important part of the case against the 
Sisters. Finally, transcripts from the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito,
30
 as 
well as other primary and secondary sources, provide detail about the local 
dynamics of the genocide and illuminate important facets of the trial. 
Because not all transnational trials follow precisely the same model, 
not all of the lessons from the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito are 
necessarily generalizable. Several of the attributes of this particular trial 
differ from those of other prosecutions in western jurisdictions for 
genocide-related crimes. For example, one of the defining characteristics 
of a trial is where it takes place. In this case, although the investigative 
judge traveled to Rwanda to interview potential witnesses, the court did 
not hold hearings in Rwanda. By contrast, in March 2010, the Finnish 
district court of East-Uusimaa moved to Dar es Salaam in neighboring 
Tanzania to hear testimony from nineteen Rwandan witnesses in the case 
against François Bazaramba.
31
 Around the same time, a Dutch court heard 
testimony in Kigali, Rwanda‘s capital, from some thirty witnesses in an 
 
 
 29. This study was not longitudinal. A longitudinal study would have required the research team 
to record the names of the survey participants, which would have detracted from the anonymity of the 
survey and undermined our efforts to elicit honest responses about sensitive subjects. 
 30. For many years, the Belgian NGO RCN Justice & Démocracie made a complete transcript of 
the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito and their two co-accused publicly available. Assises Rwanda 2001, 
RCN JUSTICE & DÉMOCRACIE, http://web.archive.org/web/20100619225608/http://www.assisesr 
wanda2001.be/plan.html (last visited May 21, 2012). That website is no longer maintained but is 
available via web archive. 
 31. The Rwandan government had previously issued an international arrest warrant for 
Bazaramba on genocide charges. The Finnish government denied the Rwandan government‘s request 
to extradite Bazaramba out of concern that he would not receive a fair trial in Rwanda. See Susanna 
Mehtonen, Finnish Genocide Trial Transfers to Tanzania, HELSINKI TIMES (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://www2.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes/finland-in-the-world-press/10117-finnish-genocide-trial-transfers-
to-tanzania.html. Bazaramba has been sentenced to life in prison. Finland Sentences Rwandan 
Preacher to Life for Genocide, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
10294529.stm. 
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appeal lodged by Joseph Mpambara, who had been sentenced by a district 
court in The Hague to twenty years imprisonment for torture.
32
  
Nonetheless, there are a number of important commonalities between 
the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito and other transnational trials. Like 
most transnational trials, the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito took place 
far from the site where the crimes were committed, in a jurisdiction that 
prizes western-style procedural protections. Moreover, although witnesses 
were flown in from Rwanda to testify, the trial was not broadcast in 
Rwanda or otherwise publicized in the community where the crimes took 
place—another common feature of transnational trials. In these respects, it 
is a quintessential transnational trial. Thus, the trial of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito ably highlights some of the promises and pitfalls of transnational 
trials as a form of transitional justice.  
III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Viewed in isolation, the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito was a 
straightforward criminal matter focused on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendants. Historical context, however, is critical to understanding the 
way that Rwandans and Belgians perceive the trial, including their biases. 
This Part briefly explores the deep roots of Belgium and the Catholic 
Church in Rwanda, the dynamics of the genocide both at the national and 
local levels, and the events that led to the eventual indictment of Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito. 
A. Belgium and the Catholic Church 
Originally a German colony, Rwanda changed hands after World War 
I, when the Treaty of Versailles gave the kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi 
(later Rwanda and Burundi) to Belgium. Belgian rule in Rwanda was 
marked by a policy of social Darwinism and racial hierarchy that 
distinguished between Hutu (eighty-four percent of the national population 
today), Tutsi (nineteen percent of the national population today), and Twa 
(roughly one percent of the national population today).
33
 Belgian census 
takers issued identity cards, and ethnicity was one of the predominant 
ways in which access to education and power was regulated, with 
 
 
 32. Dutch Court Hears Witnesses in Rwanda, INT‘L JUST. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.rnw 
.nl/international-justice/article/dutch-court-hears-witnesses-rwanda. 
 33. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2011, available at https://www 
.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html 
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members of the Tutsi minority privileged in this regard.
34
 Although 
historians largely agree that ethnic categories predated the colonial era, 
influential scholars including Mahmood Mamdani have argued that the 
colonial powers hardened those categories and infused them with the 
potency that made the genocide possible.
35
 The perception that Belgian 
rule contributed to the genocide in this manner—wholly apart from 
whether that perception is rooted in reality—hung over the trial of Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito.  
For its part, the Catholic Church, a powerful social and political 
institution in Rwanda, has been accused of complicity in the genocide, 
both indirectly and directly: indirectly by providing political support to the 
government during the genocide, and directly through the active 
participation of some members of the clergy.
36
 Missionaries, who arrived 
in Rwanda around the turn of the twentieth century, focused their 
conversion efforts not on the disadvantaged and underprivileged members 
of Rwandan society, but on the elite. If the Tutsi monarchy and local 
chiefs could be convinced to adopt Catholicism, it was argued, ―their 
subjects would naturally follow.‖37 With that policy in mind, the 
missionaries turned their attention to the Tutsi, who formed the political 
and economic elite of Rwandan society. Beginning in 1927, when 
Belgium assumed trusteeship over Rwanda, the Tutsi began to embrace 
Christianity in larger numbers at least in part because of political and 
economic realities. In Belgian-controlled Rwanda, ―[a] necessary 
prerequisite for membership of the élite . . . was to become a Christian‖ 
and to be a Tutsi.
38
 Meanwhile, the Hutu and the Twa ―constituted the 
mass of ‗roturiers‘, relegated to a status of second class citizens.‖39 As 
Timothy Longman observes, ―Christian churches were thus established 
during the colonial period not simply as allies of the government but as 
important players in contestation for state power.‖40  
 
 
 34. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND 
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 76–102 (discussing racialization). 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 80. While the nature of ethnicity in Rwanda is the subject of considerable 
debate, historians largely believe that the ethnic categories of ―Hutu‖ and ―Tutsi‖ predate colonialism. 
 36. The seminal treatment of the history of the Catholic Church in Rwanda is TIMOTHY 
LONGMAN, CHRISTIANITY AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2010). 
 37. Timothy Longman, Christian Churches and Genocide in Rwanda, in IN GOD‘S NAME: 
GENOCIDE AND RELIGION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 141 (Omer Bartov & Phyllis Mack eds., 
2001). 
 38. GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 31 (1995). 
 39. Tharcisse Gatwa, Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in Rwanda, 6 STUD. IN 
WORLD CHRISTIANITY 1, 5 (2000).  
 40. Longman, supra note 37, at 168. 
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The 1959 Social Revolution dissolved the Tutsi monarchy, upended 
Rwanda‘s social and political order, and coincided with Rwanda‘s push 
for independence. The exiting colonialists and the Church supported this 
revolution and maintained close ties with Rwanda‘s post-independence 
political elite. During Rwanda‘s first thirty-plus years of independence,41 
ethnicity remained potent as two successive Hutu dictators supported 
policies favoring their co-ethnics. Ethnic-based violence accompanied 
moments of political turmoil, in particular in 1959 through 1962, 1973, 
and 1990, though on a much more limited scale than in the 1994 
genocide.
42
 Like many former colonial powers, Belgium maintained a 
close, if not always friendly, relationship with post-independence Rwanda. 
Between 1959 and 1990, western nations including Belgium provided 
significant development aid to Rwanda,
43
 and the Catholic Church retained 
substantial influence both with the government and the people.
44
 
Beginning in 1990, Rwanda‘s military clashed with rebels from the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (―RPF‖), a guerilla force composed mainly of 
Tutsis who had been exiled to Uganda and other countries in the region 
during the transition to independence.
45
 Four years later, on the eve of 
President Juvenal Habyarimana‘s assassination, some 450 soldiers from 
the Belgian Army‘s Second Commando Battalion were stationed in 
Rwanda as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission (―UNAMIR‖).46 
The Security Council established UNAMIR in 1993 to oversee the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement that was 
intended to end the civil war and usher in a power-sharing arrangement.
47
 
 
 
 41. This period receives relatively scant treatment in the literature. A notable exception is PETER 
UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA (Kumarian Press 1998). 
 42. For additional information on Rwandan history, see, for example, CATHERINE NEWBURY, 
THE COHESION OF OPPRESSION: CLIENTSHIP AND ETHNICITY IN RWANDA, 1860–1960 (Columbia 
University Press 1988); ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN 
RWANDA (New York: Human Rights Watch 1999), available at http://addisvoice.com/Ethiopia%20 
under%20Meles/Rwanda.pdf.  
 43. See generally UVIN, supra note 41, at 40–81. 
 44. LONGMAN, supra note 36, at 162 (―The churches played an essential role in facilitating this 
descent into violence. As the primary voices of moral authority in Rwanda, the churches not only 
failed to speak out forcefully against the increasing exclusion of Tutsi and the growing violence 
against Hutu activists and Tutsis in the years leading up to the genocide but also lent strong support to 
the regime that was encouraging the exclusion and violence. . . . Because church officials at all levels 
of the institutions refused to condemn specific instances of ethnic and political violence . . . and 
because they encouraged continuing loyality to the very state that was instigating this violence, many 
Rwandans concluded that ethnic and political violence was consistent with church teachings.‖).  
 45. FORGES, supra note 42, at 48. 
 46. LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA‘S GENOCIDE 1 
(New York 2000). 
 47. See Catharine Newbury, Background to Genocide: Rwanda, 23 J. OPINION 12, 15 (1995). 
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But the Arusha Accords were not built to last. Habyarimana‘s 
assassination on April 6, 1994 shattered the fragile agreement, provided 
the spark that set off the genocide, and renewed the war between the 
Rwandan army and the RPF.  
On the night of Habyarimana‘s assassination, killings began in Kigali 
as Hutu extremists eliminated moderate Hutu political leaders.
48
 The next 
morning, on April 7, members of the Rwandan Army attacked the home of 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a political moderate who was in 
line to assume the presidency according to Rwanda‘s constitution.49 Ten 
peacekeepers from the Belgian Army‘s Second Commando Battalion had 
been assigned to protect Uwilingiyimana, but UNAMIR‘s weak mandate 
undermined their ability to carry out their mission and Uwilingiyimana 
was killed.
50
 After a firefight and protracted standoff with the Rwandan 
Army, help still had not arrived for the peacekeepers.
51
 Eventually, the 
Rwandan soldiers captured and massacred all ten Belgium peacekeepers.
52
 
Less than two weeks later, on April 19, Belgium‘s remaining peacekeepers 
had been withdrawn from Rwanda.
53
 Although the genocide would have 
likely continued even if the Belgian peacekeepers had stayed, Belgium‘s 
withdrawal reflected the lack of political will among western countries to 
stop the genocide and is a source of considerable anguish for many 
Belgians.
54
 
B. The Genocide in Sovu 
The trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito failed to provide an uncontested 
narrative of what happened in Sovu during the genocide.
55
 The account 
provided in this Part draws from statements made by nuns, survivors, and 
perpetrators in a variety of fora, including the trial of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito, local gacaca trials, interviews by the author, and interviews with 
 
 
 48. FORGES, supra note 42, at 181–201. 
 49. GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 230 (1995). 
 50. Id. 
 51. FORGES, supra note 42, at 187–92. 
 52. Id. 
 53. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 368 
(2002). 
 54. A lawsuit has been filed in Belgian court alleging that the Government of Belgium and three 
Belgian soldiers violated Belgian law when they withdrew from a school, where they had been 
protecting some 2000 Rwandan Tutsis. See Belgium Failed to Stop Tutsi Massacre in Rwanda: 
Lawyer, ASSOCIATED FOREIGN PRESS (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ 
ALeqM5gKHFeFfkJYv3ZDJ01gdCBfT05HNg. 
 55. That fact should come as little surprise, as trials are fundamentally a contest over the truth. 
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NGOs. Important facts set forth in this narrative were vigorously contested 
at trial, as Part IV details. 
Sovu is a rural community near Butare-town, Rwanda‘s intellectual 
capital and second largest city. It lies in the country‘s southern region, not 
far from Burundi, in what was known as Butare Prefecture in 1994. Before 
the genocide, it was one of the most ethnically mixed areas of Rwanda and 
political moderates held considerable power there. In 1994, Butare 
Prefecture was governed by the only Tutsi prefect in the country. For 
nearly two weeks, he and other officials in Butare Prefecture successfully 
opposed the violence that erupted after President Habyarimana‘s 
assassination on April 6.  
Even as the genocide raged elsewhere, the violence largely spared 
Sovu, but the new regime would not tolerate dissent from the policy of 
genocide. On April 17, 1994, the extremist government that seized power 
after President Habyarimana‘s assassination removed Butare‘s prefect 
from power, a move that signaled the impending violence.
56
 Although 
violence had yet to besiege Sovu, in neighboring Maraba militias had 
burned Tutsi houses and had already begun their murderous campaign. 
Beginning on April 17, many of Sovu‘s Tutsi women and children began 
to gather at the Sovu monastery and the health clinic just outside the 
monastery‘s gates.57 Meanwhile, Hutu and Tutsi men, together, fended off 
attacks launched by violent extremists from Maraba.
58
 But as the violence 
grew worse in Maraba, Tutsi men began to seek refuge, too.
59
 Knowing 
that churches had been sacrosanct during past episodes of violence, the 
refugees sought safety inside the monastery‘s church. 
As the days passed, Sr. Gertrude grew increasingly disturbed by the 
presence of Tutsi refugees in the religious compound, calling them ―dirt‖ 
and demanding that they leave the monastery.
60
 If they refused to leave, 
Sr. Gertrude said, the militias would destroy the monastery.
61
 Although Sr. 
Gertrude did not know it at the time, the génocidaires would soon destroy 
the Benedictine abbey in Gihindamuyaga, not two kilometers from Sovu, 
with Tutsi refugees trapped inside.
62
 Most of the refugees reluctantly 
 
 
 56. FORGES, supra note 42, at 164–66. 
 57. Id. at 536–38. 
 58. Id.  
 59. AFRICAN RIGHTS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: THE NUNS OF SOVU IN BELGIUM 3 (2000).  
 60. Id. at 12–13. 
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Omar McDoom, Who Kills? Social Influence, Spatial Opportunity, and Participation in 
Inter-Group Violence, Political Science and Political Economy Working Paper: London School of 
Economics, 20 (2011), http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/PSPE/pdf/PSPE_WP4_ 
11.pdf. 
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obeyed Sr. Gertrude‘s instructions and went to the health center. But some 
refugees managed to climb over or sneak through the locked gates and into 
the monastic compound. Some huddled together in a small room, while 
others spent the night exposed to the elements on the monastery‘s outdoor 
volleyball court.
63
 As tensions mounted in Sovu and as more and more 
refugees sought safety in the monastery, Sr. Gertrude refused to provide 
them with food, water, or shelter.
64
 
On April 19, the interim President and Prime Minister traveled to 
Butare to deliver a message: all men should be prepared to ―work‖—a 
euphemism for ―kill.‖65 Soon thereafter, moderates lost control of Sovu. 
Emmanuel Rekeraho, an adherent of the extremist ―Pawa‖ political 
ideology, became Sovu‘s de facto leader.66 A former army officer who had 
been working as a driver for the World Food Program, Rekeraho recruited, 
trained, and led the militia that was instrumental in perpetrating the 
genocide in Sovu.
67
 
In the days following the prefect‘s removal, refugees continued to seek 
safety at the health center, the church, and the monastery.
68
 In response, 
Sr. Gertrude repeated her order that the refugees leave the religious 
compound and asked a group of soldiers to force the refugees out.
69
 
Meanwhile, militias assembled outside the monastery‘s gates, wielding 
machetes, clubs, guns, and grenades. On April 20, Sr. Gertrude lent 
Rekeraho the health center‘s ambulance, which he used to drive along the 
dirt paths of Sovu, exhorting Hutus to join the killing campaign.
70
 
According to Sr. Kizito‘s brother, Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were 
inseparable from Rekeraho during the genocide.
71
 Other nuns reported that 
Rekeraho made frequent visits to the monastery for secret meetings with 
Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, that they gave him milk to drink, and that Sr. 
Kizito spent a substantial amount of time outside the monastery with the 
militia.
72
  
 
 
 63. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 3–7.  
 64. Id. at 12–15. 
 65. Id. at 7; FORGES, supra note 42, at 351–52. ―Slaughter was known as ‗work‘ and machetes 
and firearms were described as ‗tools.‘‖ Id. at 11.  
 66. Rekeraho was president of the local Mouvement démocratique républicain (―MDR‖) political 
party and an adherent of MDR-Power. 
 67. Rekeraho served as a deputy to Aloys Simba, head of security for Butare and Gikongoro 
Prefectures, to maintain security in Butare. Simba was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
 68. FORGES, supra note 42, at 536–39. 
 69. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 7–9. 
 70. Id. at 10–11. 
 71. Id. at 37. 
 72. Id. 
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The first major massacre in Sovu began in the early morning hours of 
April 22 as soldiers, Rekeraho‘s militia, communal policemen, and 
civilians attacked refugees at the health center.
73
 The killing continued for 
hours. Unable to hide in the religious compound, several hundred refugees 
sought safety in the health center‘s garage. But that afternoon, they were 
burned alive when the health center‘s garage was set ablaze, the doors 
barricaded shut and the flames ignited with gasoline allegedly supplied by 
Srs. Gertrude and Kizito.
74
 (A key question during the trial was whether 
one or both of the nuns had in fact provided the gasoline.) As many as 
5000 were dead after one day, among them refugees whom Sr. Gertrude, 
as the mother superior, had cast out of the religious compound. It took 
days to bury the dead in mass graves outside the health center.
75
 
 
The gates to the monastery
76
 
 
 
 73. Sovu residents and lawyers for Sisters Gertrude and Kizito refer loosely to civilian killers as 
interahamwe, but Rekeraho told me that Sovu did not have any interahamwe—the youth militia from 
the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (―MRND‖) party. Rather, 
Rekeraho provided military-style training to members of the youth wing of the MDR party and others. 
Interview with Emmanuel Rekeraho, Karubanda Prison, Butare, Rwanda (May 24, 2007).  
 74. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 19–24. 
 75. Id. at 26–27. 
 76. Photo courtesy of Jens Meierhenrich, Through a Glass Darkly: Genocide Memorials in 
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In the second wave of killings, which began in the days following the 
burning of the health center, militias searched for Tutsi who had escaped 
the initial massacres. A group of refugees—including employees of the 
monastery, Tutsis who had been in Sovu for a training course, and 
relatives of Tutsi nuns—were hiding in the convent.77 But on April 25, 
Srs. Gertrude and Kizito worked with Rekeraho and other local leaders to 
force some thirty Tutsi refugees from their hiding places.
78
 Cast out, the 
refugees had no place to hide. Militias killed the refugees outside the 
convent.
79
 For the moment, the relatives of Tutsi nuns were spared except 
for one girl, the cousin of a Tutsi nun, who Sr. Gertrude allegedly forced 
to leave as the others were being slaughtered.
80
 
 
Mass graves in Sovu, steps from the monastery‘s gates.81  
 
 
Rwanda 1994—Present (2010), http://genocidememorials.cga.harvard.edu/sovu.html. 
 77. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 28. 
 78. Id. at 28–30. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 30. 
 81. Meierhenrich, supra note 76. 
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By the beginning of May, some twenty or thirty refugees—the relatives 
of Tutsi nuns—remained inside the monastery.82 On May 5, frustrated that 
the militias had not come to her aid in ridding the monastery of these 
remaining refugees, Sr. Gertrude wrote a chilling letter to the authorities in 
Butare.
83
 She begged them to remove the remaining refugees from the 
monastery so that daily spiritual activities could ―resume in peace.‖84 She 
wrote: 
Mr. Mayor, 
 In recent weeks, there has been, in the monastery of Sovu, the 
usual arrival of visitors. Normally, their stay does not extend 
beyond a week. Some have come on mission and others on holiday 
or a prayer retreat.  
 Since the war has spread throughout the country, others have 
come unexpectedly and they insist on staying here. And we have no 
way of maintaining them illegally. A few days ago I asked the 
municipal authorities to come and give notice that they would have 
to return home or go elsewhere. Although they want to live here in 
the monastery, we no longer have any means of subsistence. 
 I am pleading with you, Mr. Mayor, that May 6, 1994 is the 
deadline. Everything must be finished by that date so that the daily 
activities of the monastery can resume in peace. We entrust you to 
God in our prayers.
85
 
On May 6, after the morning prayers, Sr. Gertrude told the nuns, ―Before 
God Almighty, I am asking all the Sisters who have relatives here to expel 
them, otherwise we will use force.‖86 She turned the refugees over to the 
communal police and told them to go home.
87
 Sr. Kizito searched the 
ceiling of the monastery to ensure that no refugees remained hidden.
88
 
 
 
 82. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 31. 
 83. FORGES, supra note 42, at 537. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par 
l’avocat général, http://web.archive.org/web/20090508075102/http://www.assisesrwanda2001.be/ 
040100.html (last visited May 21, 2012) (translated from French by author).  
 86. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 33. 
 87. Id. at 31–36. 
 88. Id. at 34. 
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Most of the refugees, if not all, were killed after their removal.
89
 The 
monastery had been purged. 
For two months, the monastery returned to its daily activities. 
Meanwhile, war ravaged the country and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (―RPF‖) was routing the Rwandan Armed Forces (―FAR‖). On July 
3, 1994, as the RPF advanced, Sovu‘s Hutu population fled to Gikongoro 
Prefecture in large numbers.
90
 There, France had established a zone of 
control known as Opération Turquoise, which allowed génocidaires and 
refugees alike to escape across the border to Zaire.
91
 It is via the French 
zone of control that nuns from the Sovu monastery, including Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito, eventually reached Belgium, where they found a 
temporary home at the Benedictine convent at Maredret.
92
 
C. A Community Divided 
In Belgium, Sovu‘s Benedictine community was deeply divided. While 
some of the nuns supported Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, others accused them 
of complicity in the genocide.
93
 Still the mother superior of the Sovu 
community, Sr. Gertrude used her position of authority to silence the Sovu 
nuns.
94
 Sr. Gertrude scattered the Sovu nuns, assigning them to convents 
around Belgium, so that they would not be able to speak to one another 
freely.
95
 The Benedictine order in Belgium stood behind Sr. Gertrude and 
tried to suppress any accusations against her.
96
 According to Sr. Mélanie, 
one of the Sovu nuns, several sisters ―wanted to denounce [Sr. Gertrude‘s] 
bad behavior. But no one was interested in asking about it.‖97 
Tensions within the community rose in November 1994 when Srs. 
Marie-Bernard and Scholastique, who had been critical of Sr. Gertrude, 
announced their intention to return to Rwanda.
98
 Their decision sparked 
much consternation in the Benedictine community. Sr. Gertrude and the 
Benedictine hierarchy forbade Srs. Marie-Bernard and Scholastique from 
leaving Belgium.
99
 But they left anyway and arrived in Butare on 
 
 
 89. Id. at 31–36. 
 90. Interviews with Sovu residents, 2006–07 and 2010. 
 91. FORGES, supra note 42, at 683–88; AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 42. 
 92. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 42. 
 93. Id. at 42–47. 
 94. Id. at 43–44. 
 95. Id. at 43. 
 96. Id. at 44. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 45. 
 99. Id. at 44–46. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
384 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:365 
 
 
 
 
December 4, 1994.
100
 Their departure pierced the silence as survivors in 
Rwanda and nuns in Belgium began to speak out against Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito. Eventually, the Belgian media picked up the story, sparking alarm 
within the Benedictine order.
101
 
The divide within the community then played out in public. Speaking 
to the press, Sr. Marie-Jeanne, also of the Sovu monastery, defended Sr. 
Gertrude.
102
 She attributed tensions in the community to the fact that many 
of the nuns had lost family members during the genocide.
103
 Sr. Marie-
Jeanne reported that Sr. Gertrude had cast the ―guests‖ out of the 
monastery in order to save the community from destruction.
104
 Like Sr. 
Marie-Jeanne and other Sovu nuns, the Benedictine hierarchy insisted that 
Sr. Gertrude had played something of a hero‘s role, saving the religious 
order from being destroyed by the militias.
105
 The accusations made by 
some nuns against Sr. Gertrude were motivated by external conflicts, said 
Sr. Marie-Jeanne: ―You know how Rwanda is and especially now . . . . It 
seems that denunciations are made to settle scores.‖106 
Not all of the Sovu nuns shared Sr. Marie-Jeanne‘s account of Sr. 
Gertrude‘s conduct during the genocide. Several nuns resisted a request by 
the Benedictine order to make written statements in support of Sr. 
Gertrude.
107
 After the departure of Srs. Marie-Bernard and Scholastique, 
Sr. Gertrude convened a meeting to discuss their expulsion from the 
community.
108
 But in a secret ballot, the nuns voted against expulsion.
109
 
The vote signaled the community‘s growing opposition to Sr. Gertrude. As 
a consequence, Sr. Gertrude resigned as mother superior.
110
  
The rift among the Sovu nuns would not heal as pressure on Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito continued to mount. In May 1995, the Belgian 
newspaper Solidaire published an article about Srs. Gertrude and Kizito.
111
 
Subsequent media accounts, including the African Rights report Rwanda: 
 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 46–47. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 46–47, 51. 
 106. Id. at 47. 
 107. Id. at 47–49. 
 108. Id. at 49. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 48–49. 
 111. See Belgium’s Rwandan Genocide Trail, REUTERS (June 8, 2001), http://www.atour.com/ 
~aahgn/news/20010611a.html (―July 3 - Sister Gertrude files complaint against weekly Solidaire for 
accusing her of helping Hutus kill Tutsis at convent.‖)  
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Not So Innocent, When Women Become Killers,
112
 also focused on the role 
Srs. Gertrude and Kizito allegedly played in the genocide. The Sisters had 
been exposed. 
IV. ON TRIAL: TWELVE BELGIANS JUDGE FOUR RWANDANS 
Although Srs. Gertrude and Kizito remained in Belgium, their absence 
from Rwanda did not protect them from prosecution. In 2001, after the 
Sisters had been charged under Belgium‘s universal jurisdiction statute, 
the trial commenced. The jury of Belgians selected to decide the case 
heard testimony from eye-witnesses, but the attorneys defending Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito raised doubt about the accuracy of this testimony, and 
Emmanuel Rekeraho—the convicted leader of the genocide in Sovu—
recanted damning statements he had made against the Sisters. After 
hearing dozens of witnesses testify, and after hours of deliberation, the 
jury reached a verdict that would ring out to the world. 
A. Charges under Belgium’s Universal Jurisdiction Statute 
In January 1996, Damien Vandermeersch, a Belgian investigative 
judge, formally charged Sr. Gertrude for her role in the genocide.
113
 As 
part of his investigation, Judge Vandermeersch traveled to Sovu in 1995 to 
interview genocide survivors and several of the Sovu nuns, who had 
returned to their monastery.
114
 Because he lacked sufficient evidence, it 
was not until 1999 that Judge Vandermeersch formally charged Sr. Kizito 
as well. It would be two more years before the trial finally began. 
The Benedictine order, which had staunchly defended Srs. Gertrude 
and Kizito, hired four well-respected Belgian defense attorneys to 
represent the Sisters.
115
 Gilles Vanderbeck and Serge Wahis represented 
Sr. Kizito, while brothers Alain and Cédric Vergauwen represented Sr. 
 
 
 112. Rwanda: Not So Innocent, When Women Become Killers, AFRICAN RIGHTS (Aug. 1995), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21263653/Rwanda-Not-so-Innocent-When-Womens-Became-Killers-
Africa-Rights-August-1995.  
 113. In the Belgian system, an investigative judge, a member of the judiciary with lifetime tenure, 
begins an investigation for serious offenses at the request of the prosecutor or a victim. Code 
d‘instruction Criminelle [C.I.CR.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Art. 55; see also Langer, supra note 
7, at 27. 
 114. Interview with Damien Vandermeersch, former Investigative Judge, in Brussels, Belgium 
(Sept. 15, 2010). 
 115. Interview with Alain Vergauwen & Serge Wahis, Defense Attorneys for Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito, in Brussels, Belg. (Sept. 8, 2009) (translated from French by author); Interview with Gilles 
Vanderbeck, Defense Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium (Sept. 7, 2009). 
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Gertrude.
116
 The Sisters faced trial with two co-accused from Butare: 
Vincent Ntezimana, a professor at the National University of Rwanda, and 
Alphonse Higaniro, a prominent businessman and an associate of 
President Habyarimana.
117
 Although their cases were not factually related, 
the so-called ―Butare Four‖ were tried together because they hailed from 
the same region of Rwanda and they all had fled to Belgium after the 
genocide.
118
 
The trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito is typically referred to as a 
genocide trial, but the Sisters were charged with murder under the Belgian 
and Rwandan criminal codes and with war crimes.
119
 The war crimes 
charges were brought under the Act Concerning Grave Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law, under common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and under Article 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol II 
to the Convention.
120
  
B. The Women Beneath the Habit 
The trial of the so-called Butare Four commenced on April 17, 2001, 
exactly seven years after Tutsi women and children began to seek refuge at 
the monastery in Sovu.
121
 Dressed in the Benedictine habit of a brown veil, 
a beige robe, and a crucifix against their chests, Srs. Gertrude and Kizito 
appeared ―inoffensive,‖ even ―angelic.‖122 The crimes of which they were 
 
 
 116. Interview with Alain Vergauwen & Serge Wahis, Defense Attorneys for Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito, in Brussels, Belg. (Sept. 8, 2009) (translated from French by author); Interview with Gilles 
Vanderbeck, Defense Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium (Sept. 7, 2009). 
 117. See generally Luc Reydams, Belgium’s First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: The 
Butare Four Case, 1 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 428 (2003). 
 118. See generally id. 
 119. Transcript of Record, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par l’avocat général, supra note 85. 
 120. Id. The indictment provides: ―Accusés des crimes prévus par les articles communs 3-50-130 
et 147 aux quatre Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 article 85, paragraphes 1 et 2 du Protocole 
additionnel 1 1.2, paragraphes 1 et 4, paragraphe 2 du Protocole additionnel 2. L‘article 1, paragraphe 
3 1° 2-4-5 et 6 de la loi du 16 juin 1993, modifiée par la loi du 10 février 1999. Les articles 51-52-53-
66-67-392-393 et 394 du Code pénal belge et les articles 21-22-24-89-90-91-166-310 et 393 du Code 
pénal rwandais.‖ Transcript of Record, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par l’avocat général, supra note 
85.  
 121. Andrew Osborn, Belgium puts nuns in dock for Rwanda genocide, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 
2001), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/apr/17/warcrimes. 
 122. LAURE DE VULPIAN, RWANDA, UN GENOCIDE OUBLIE? UN PROCES POUR MEMOIRE 49 
(Belgium: Éditions Complexe 2004). 
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accused, of course, were anything but. The attorney general read the 
indictment against Srs. Gertrude and Kizito in open court: 
In the prefecture of Butare in Rwanda, between April 17, 1994 and 
May 7, 1994, on several occasions, including April 22, 1994, April 
25, 1994, and May 6, 1994. 
A.  Deliberately, with the intention of killing and in a premeditated 
fashion, murdered Déo GATETE and Placide SEPT. 
B.  Deliberately, with the intention of killing and in a premeditated 
fashion, murdered Chantal MUSABYEMARIYA and Arnaud 
Crispin BUTERA. 
C.  Deliberately, with the intention of killing and in a premeditated 
fashion, murdered a number of unspecified persons whose identities 
are not known as of this day.
123
 
Who are these women who pursued a life of the cloth, only to be accused 
of such heinous crimes? These are their biographies, as revealed at trial. 
Sr. Gertrude, née Consolata Mukangango, was born in Gitarama in central 
Rwanda on August 15, 1958.
124
 She began her religious studies with the 
Benedictine nuns near her home and entered the Sovu convent at the age 
of nineteen.
125
 She studied in France and in Belgium at the abbey of 
Maredret before rejoining the Sovu community in 1991.
126
 As the mother 
superior, she led a group of thirty-one nuns, including seventeen Tutsi.
127
 
At trial, Sr. Gertrude expressed uncertainty about her own ethnicity: ―I had 
a Hutu identity card,‖ she testified, ―but since my youth and until the end 
of the genocide, I was always considered a Tutsi . . . .‖128 In 1994, her 
parents fled their home to escape militia attacks. Her father was shot and 
killed.
129
 Her mother, brother, and two sisters managed to hide and they 
survived.
130
 
 
 
 123. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par 
l’avocat général, http://web.archive.org/web/20090508075102/http://www.assisesrwanda2001.be/ 
040100.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012); see also VULPIAN, supra note 122, at 49–52. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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Sr. Maria Kizito, née Julienne Mukabutera, is a native of Sovu born on 
June 22, 1964.
131
 After Sr. Kizito‘s father died, she took the holy vows and 
joined the Benedictine order at Sovu as a novice, or junior nun.
132
 Born to 
a Hutu family, some of Sr. Kizito‘s brothers are said to have been among 
the most zealous killers in Sovu.
133
 Judging by the home where Sr. 
Kizito‘s mother lives today, her family is of average means for Sovu, 
where only a few homes have electricity and where floors are made of dirt 
or cement.
134
  
In the court psychiatrist‘s opinion, both Srs. Gertrude and Kizito 
suffered from psychological impairments.
135
 The psychiatrist diagnosed 
Sr. Gertrude with post-traumatic stress disorder and ―psychosis.‖136 The 
psychiatrist also diagnosed Sr. Kizito with post-traumatic stress disorder, 
as well as a ―fragile‖ and ―neurotic‖ personality.137 Despite these findings, 
the psychiatrist determined that both Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were 
capable of understanding the consequences of their actions and deemed 
them fit to stand trial.
138
 
C. A Jury of One’s Peers? 
In accordance with Belgian procedure,
139
 a group of twelve Belgians 
was selected at random to sit as the jury for the four Rwandans accused of 
crimes allegedly committed more than 6000 kilometers away, in a small 
farming community where people live a lifestyle alien to most Europeans.  
This arrangement warrants reflection. The potential difficulty in asking 
Belgians to judge Rwandans is not one of moral relativism or legal 
positivism. Murder was a crime under Rwandan law just as it was under 
Belgian law and both Rwanda and Belgium were parties to the Genocide 
Convention long before 1994.
140
 Rather, the potential difficulty lies in 
Belgium‘s longstanding ties with Rwanda and the potential social and 
 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 18. 
 133. AFRICAN RIGHTS, supra note 59, at 22. 
 134. This information is based on the author‘s personal observation during a visit Sr. Kizito‘s 
mother‘s home as part of the research and interviews conducted in 2007. 
 135. Transcript of Record, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par l’avocat général, supra note 85. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. JUDICIAL CODE [C.JUD/GER.W] art. 119 (Belg.). 
 140. Chapter IV Human Rights 1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src 
=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en#Participants (last visited Aug. 10, 
2012). 
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cultural gap between Belgians and Rwandans.
141
 Might a jury convict out 
of a sense of national guilt for Belgium‘s historical relationship with 
Rwanda? Would a Belgian jury possess the cultural understanding and 
sensitivity to sort truth from fiction? 
During the summer of 2009, Gilles Vanderbeck, Sr. Kizito‘s attorney, 
was interviewed for this Article in his modern office in a prosperous 
Brussels neighborhood. Vanderbeck has made a career out of defending 
Rwandans accused of genocide. Like the other three lawyers hired to 
defend Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, he spent several months in Butare in the 
early 2000s with Avocats Sans Frontières, a Belgian NGO that arranged 
for international attorneys to represent victims and defendants before the 
Rwandan courts.
142
 He has defended four Rwandans, including Sr. Kizito, 
before the Belgian courts.
143
 Vanderbeck implored: 
Imagine how hard it is for a citizen of Belgium in 2001—somebody 
who knows nothing about Rwanda, or who does not know much 
about Rwanda except what he read in a newspaper, who has this 
feeling that we all had at the end of the genocide, that we could 
have done something to avoid it but that we did not do anything.
144
  
While Vanderbeck developed an understanding of Rwanda‘s history and 
culture through his work as a defense attorney for a decade, the jurors 
were not afforded the same opportunity. As Alain Vergauwen, co-counsel 
for Sr. Gertrude, told me, ―Not only was there the consideration of 
distance, but also of attitude . . . . One of our regrets—it was only an eight 
week trial—is that we did not have enough time to permit the jurors to 
really understand Rwanda and its mentality . . . .‖145 
Why is Rwanda‘s culture relevant to the factual question of Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito‘s guilt? Serge Wahis, co-counsel for Sr. Kizito, 
related a story from when he represented a defendant before Rwanda‘s 
domestic courts: Accused of a crime carrying the death penalty, the 
defendant refused to confess, notwithstanding Wahis‘ advice. The 
defendant‘s father and brother testified that the defendant acted admirably 
 
 
 141. See, e.g., FORGES, supra note 42, at 34-40. 
 142. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, Defense Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium 
(Sept. 7, 2009). Also note that Avocats Sans Frontières should not be confused with Lawyers Without 
Borders, an American NGO. 
 143. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, Defense Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium 
(Sept. 7, 2009). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Interview with Alain Vergauwen & Serge Wahis, Defense Attorneys for Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito, in Brussels, Belg. (Sept. 8, 2009) (translated from French by author). 
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during the genocide, tending his fields by day and caring for his wife at 
night. The three-judge panel, reportedly composed of one Tutsi and two 
Hutus, listened carefully to the testimony. After deliberating, the president 
of the panel told the witnesses that they would be subject to five years in 
prison for perjury. ―The court will rehear you,‖ the president insisted, ―and 
you will tell the truth.‖146At this point, the witnesses dramatically altered 
their story, telling the court that the defendant ―killed everything that 
moved and the next day took his club into a cabaret where he bragged 
about what he had done.‖147 While the judge may have simply intimidated 
the witnesses into telling a different version of the story, Wahis credited 
the judge for detecting false testimony.
148
 Wahis noted: ―A Belgian judge, 
or any foreign judge, could not have done that, and it is so complicated for 
us as Europeans to recognize when [a Rwandan] is not telling the truth.‖149  
Of course, cultural differences are a common feature of typical 
domestic trials as well. Judge Vandermeersch pointed out that individuals 
who share common educational backgrounds may see the world similarly 
even though they come from two very different countries.
150
 On the other 
hand, individuals who come from the same country may see the world 
very differently if, for example, one has gone to university in a city while 
the other had not completed primary education.
151
  
D. Questions About the Accuracy of Witness Testimony 
The jury‘s ability to sort truth from fiction was particularly important 
because much of the most damning evidence against the nuns, in particular 
against Sr. Kizito, came in the form of witness testimony.
152
 As is the case 
in virtually all trials for the Rwandan genocide, no forensic or ballistic 
evidence was available. Rather, dozens of witnesses, including nuns and 
widows from Sovu, travelled from Rwanda to give testimony in 
Belgium.
153
 The reliability of this testimony and the jury‘s ability to 
accurately assess credibility would determine the fate of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito. 
 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Interview with Damien Vandermeersch, supra note 114. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Transcript of Record, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par l’avocat général, supra note 85. 
The letter Sr. Gertrude wrote pleading with the mayor to rid the monastery of the refugees provided 
strong evidence against her. Id. 
 153. Transcript of Record, Lecture de l’acte d’accusation par l’avocat général, supra note 85. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] TRANSNATIONAL TRIALS AS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  391 
 
 
 
 
To this day, defense attorneys for the Sisters question the credibility of 
the testimony used to convict their clients. Vanderbeck lamented that some 
of the witnesses who had been slated to testify on behalf of the defense fell 
silent at trial: 
[W]hen the time came for them [defense witnesses] to testify before 
the court, they did not change the content of their testimony, but 
they were almost silent. We had to ask them, ―Please can you 
confirm?‖ But they did not want to be too involved because they 
knew they had to go back to Rwanda to live with these other sisters. 
. . . It‘s unbelievable, to ask justice to be done in this situation.154 
Vanderbeck also raised doubt about the motives of the witnesses who 
testified against the Sisters. ―Some of the sisters were against Sisters 
Gertrude and Kizito for several reasons,‖ he said, including because their 
families had been killed and because of in-fighting related to the election 
of the new mother superior.
155
 In interviews, some Sovu residents 
expressed similar suspicions.
156
 
Indeed, witness testimony at trial often differed in important ways from 
statements the same witnesses provided to Belgian and Rwandan 
investigators years before. Gilles Vanderbeck and other defense lawyers 
pressed witnesses to explain the inconsistencies: ―[W]hen you asked them 
[the witnesses] why, five years before when their memories were better, 
they said the opposite of what they were stating during the trial, they said 
maybe what they said was not recorded accurately or they were very—and 
they start crying—they were pushed by policemen.‖157  
One of the most important subjects of witness testimony concerned 
who carried the gasoline used to burn the health center‘s garage, where 
refugees had sought safety. After Witness 38, a female survivor, told the 
court that she saw both Srs. Gertrude and Kizito carrying gasoline to the 
health center, Vergauwen initiated the following colloquy:
158
 
Mr. Vergauwen: I will read the transcript . . . of an interview 
conducted [with Witness 38] by Mr. Delvaux and the Rwandan 
investigator. In that interview, the witness declared, ―I saw Kizito 
giving Emmanuel Rekeraho a jerrycan of gasoline.‖ On October 8, 
 
 
 154. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, supra note 142. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Interview with Sovu resident, in Sovu, Rwanda (Sept. 2010). 
 157. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, supra note 142. 
 158. It is not apparent from the transcript whether it is Cédric or his brother Alain Vergauwen who 
is conducting the questioning.  
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1995, the witness, if I understand correctly, did not speak of Sr. 
Gertrude accompanying Sr. Kizito with the gasoline. And another 
question: why did she speak of a single jerrycan of gasoline? I 
would like to know, Mr. President, why there is a divergence today 
in her testimony.  
President: According to the transcript . . . , Mrs. Witness 38, when 
she speaks of the episode of the gasoline, she speaks only of Sr. 
Kizito and only of a single jerrycan of gasoline . . . . 
[Kinyarwanda translation and clarification] 
Witness 38: It is possible that my statements were misunderstood or 
misinterpreted . . . . I was being interviewed by many people at the 
same time. Sometimes, it was difficult to tell them where the truth 
lay. What I am telling you now, it is what I saw, it is what I 
experienced.
159
 
Later, during questioning by Serge Wahis about another apparent 
discrepancy between her testimony at trial and her past statements, 
Witness 38 declared: ―I told you that after the war in 1994–1995, we were 
questioned by many people. Finally, we thought that it was a game and, 
sometimes, we told them whatever we wanted.‖160 The president of the 
court interjected, telling the jurors: 
I would like to tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury that they 
should not be surprised to hear contradictory statements in witness 
testimony from time to time. It happens even in ordinary trials. So 
do not be surprised if [one witness says one thing] and another 
witness says the opposite. Do not be surprised.
161
 
Similar colloquies were repeated with other witnesses, including Laurent 
Ntezimana (no relation to Vincent Ntezimana, a co-defendant), who 
visited the religious compound twice during the genocide to deliver rice: 
PRESIDENT: Do you remember the nun who took delivery of the rice 
when you arrived? 
 
 
 159. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Audition des témoins: le témoin 
38, http://assisesrwanda2001.be/080605.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (translation from French by 
author). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] TRANSNATIONAL TRIALS AS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  393 
 
 
 
 
WITNESS 110 (NTEZIMANA): It was the mother superior [Sr. 
Gertrude]. 
PRESIDENT: In your declaration, you speak of Sr. Scholastique.  
WITNESS 110: Also, yes. I think I saw them both. 
PRESIDENT: You have explained that the rice was unloaded in front 
of the communion wafer workshop. 
WITNESS 110: Yes. 
PRESIDENT: You also have explained that Sr. Scholastique called 
refugees to help unload the sacks of rice. 
WITNESS 110: I think so, yes. 
PRESIDENT: But in your declaration, at the time, you said that you 
never saw the mother superior, Sr. Gertrude, that day. So, do you 
remember having seen, having seen only Sr. Scholastique? 
WITNESS 110: I‘m confused about this subject.162 
Several phenomena may help explain these and other inconsistencies in 
witness testimony. The problem of memory fallibility, which plagues all 
testimony, may be exacerbated when the events in question are highly 
traumatic.
163
 Furthermore, travelling by airplane to Europe for the first 
time for questioning and testimony in a courtroom with the presence of 
translators, lawyers, the judge, and jurors may have been an overwhelming 
experience for the Rwandan witnesses. Finally, as Judge Vandermeersch 
has observed in his scholarly writing, ―[l]ong lapses [in time between the 
events in question and the trial] serve to erode witnesses‘ recollections, 
[and] create discrepancies in [witness testimony].‖164 
Social dynamics also might have shaped the version of events that 
witnesses provided to investigators or at trial. According to Filip 
 
 
 162. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Audition des témoins: le témoin 
110, http://assisesrwanda2001.be/080604.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (translation from French by 
author). 
 163. For an overview of the problem of memory fallibility in ordinary contexts, see generally 
Laura Engelhardt, The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony: Commentary on a Talk by George Fisher 
& Barbara Tversky, 1 STAN. J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (1999), available at http://agora.stanford.edu/sjls/ 
images/pdf/engelhardt.pdf. 
 164. Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium, 3 J. INT‘L CRIM. 
JUST. 400, 411 (2005). 
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Reyntjens, Rwandans tend to communicate ―strategically.‖165 Before 
responding to a question, Rwandans may consider the personal 
consequences: Does the person posing the question have authority over 
me? Can this person help me or hurt me? Can they arrest me, have me 
fired, or even kill me?
166
 In the course of research in Sovu for the Article, 
several interviewees expressed fear that they would be punished for 
expressing opinions contrary to government policies. One woman said, 
―Do not show my answers to the authorities. They would condemn me.‖167 
Feelings of insecurity also could have affected witness testimony, 
whether the witness was testifying for the prosecution or the defense. But 
protections for witnesses can be in tension with the defendant‘s 
confrontation rights. As Judge Vandermeersch has written: 
While witnesses must receive protective measures, namely through 
anonymity, such protection cannot endanger defence rights and the 
principle of contradiction. Faced with unanimous opprobrium in 
cases of serious violations of humanitarian law, the defence has a 
particularly delicate task. Does it have sufficient resources to resist 
prejudice? How can it ensure contradictory debate?
168
 
Vanderbeck expressed the view that ―most of the witnesses were really 
guided by their lawyers or local authorities to make sure that their 
testimony was going to the sense that the sisters are guilty.‖169 Witnesses 
flew together from Rwanda—with the expenses covered by Belgium—and 
witnesses who had planned to testify on behalf of the Sisters may have 
been pressured to change their testimony. ―When you were a witness for 
[the defense],‖ Vanderbeck explained, ―you were not well considered by 
other people and you may risk your life or the lives of your relatives . . . . 
[I]t‘s hard when the time comes to testify to be honest.‖170 While these 
problems are not unique to the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, the 
Belgian jury would have struggled to comprehend the intense social 
pressures that a Rwandan might have felt in preparing to testify for or 
against the accused. Moreover, although it is difficult to assess the 
pressures facing witnesses, acts of intimidation and violence against 
 
 
 165. LAURE DE VULPIAN, RWANDA, UN GENOCIDE OUBLIÉ? UN PROCÈS POUR MÉMOIRE 82 
(Belgium: Éditions Complexe 2004). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Interview with anonymous Sovu resident in Sovu, Rwanda (May 2007). 
 168. Vandermeersch, supra note 164, at 411. 
 169. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, supra note 142. 
 170. Id. 
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genocide survivors and gacaca witnesses took place in Sovu in 2006 to 
2007.
171
  
E. Emmanuel Rekeraho: The Key Witness Who Never Testified 
While the testimony of survivors and nuns was vital, perhaps the key 
prosecution witness was Emmanuel Rekeraho, the man who is widely seen 
as the leader of the genocide in Sovu. But Rekeraho never appeared in 
court to testify.
172
 During the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, Rekeraho 
remained in Rwanda, where he had been under lock and key since 1996, 
when Rwandan authorities arrested him in Zaire.
173
 Although Rekeraho 
did not travel to Belgium to testify, statements that Rekeraho had given to 
an investigator for the ICTR condemned the Sisters.
174
 The ICTR 
investigator testified at trial and a written copy of Rekeraho‘s statement 
was admitted into evidence.
175
 Yet during the trial, Rekeraho sent a letter 
to the investigative judge in which he called his statements to the ICTR 
investigator ―pure lies‖ and declared that the Sisters are ―truly 
innocent.‖176 Rekeraho‘s story—how he came to provide a statement to the 
ICTR investigator, his subsequent change of heart about the role the 
Sisters played in the genocide, and the reasons that he did not testify in 
Belgium—is indispensible in evaluating the trial of Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito. 
In February 1999, Rekeraho found himself imprisoned in one of 
Rwanda‘s infamous jails, facing the death penalty.177 An ICTR 
investigator, Réjean Tremblay, travelled to Rwanda to interview Rekeraho 
about the massacres perpetrated in Sovu.
178
 At the time, the ICTR‘s focus 
 
 
 171. See Max Rettig, Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Rwanda?, 51 
AFR. STUD. REV. 25, 42–44 (2008). 
 172. Luc Reydams, Belgium’s First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case, 
1 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 428, 436 (2003). 
 173. Interview with Emmanuel Rekeraho, Karubanda Prison, Butare, Rwanda (May 24, 2007). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Letter from Emmanuel Rekeraho to Judge Damien Vandermeersch, May 5, 2001 (on file 
with author). 
 177. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED 
WITH OUR FAMILIES 246–49 (1998). Gourevitch describes walking through a packed prison in 
Gitarama in 1995, where standing water had caused inmates‘ feet to rot and where ―even during the 
dry season a scum of condensation, urine, and bits of dropped food covered the floor.‖ Id. This prison 
was one of the worst in Rwanda at the time, and although prison conditions have improved throughout 
the country since 1995, they remain overcrowded. 
 178. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Audition des témoins: Réjean 
Tremblay, http://web.archive.org/web/20050224213736/http://www.assisesrwanda2001.be/080603 
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was on Srs. Gertrude and Kizito. Initially, Rekeraho stonewalled 
Tremblay, and then he denied playing any role in the genocide and refused 
to provide any information to further the investigation.
179
 Tremblay and 
his translator left empty-handed.
180
  
Months later, Tremblay received a copy of Sr. Gertrude‘s application 
for political asylum in Belgium. In the letter, Sr. Gertrude accused 
Rekeraho of having organized the massacres in Sovu.
181
 Tremblay 
returned to see Rekeraho and showed him the letter. Rekeraho‘s attitude 
changed abruptly and he agreed to provide a statement to the ICTR. In a 
fifty-six page sworn statement, dated June 7, 1999, Rekeraho 
acknowledged his role in the genocide, provided damning testimony 
against Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, and agreed to serve as a prosecution 
witness in Arusha.
182
 In exchange, Rekeraho‘s case would be transferred 
from the Rwandan courts, where he was still awaiting trial, to the ICTR.
183
 
It is not hard to see why Rekeraho would have found this deal enticing. 
The maximum penalty at the ICTR is life imprisonment, whereas 
Rekeraho faced the death penalty in Rwanda.
184
 Moreover, in Arusha, 
Rekeraho would have lived in far more comfortable conditions, as 
compared to a Rwandan prison.
185
 In his closing statement on behalf of Sr. 
Gertrude, Vergauwen drew an explicit link between Rekeraho‘s desire to 
be transferred to the ICTR and his statements condemning Srs. Gertrude 
and Kizito: ―For Emmanuel Rekeraho, the International Criminal Tribunal 
 
 
.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (translation from French by author); see also Le Soir, 18 April 2001: 
‗Contre l‘évidence. Rekeraho rétracte ses aveux'. 
 179. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Auditions des témoins: le témoin 
Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, http://assisesrwanda2001.be/080603.html (last visited Aug. 10, 
2012) (translation from French by author). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Copy on file with author. See also Transcript of Record, Auditions des témoins: le témoin 
Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, supra note 181. 
 183. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Auditions des témoins: le témoin 
Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, http://assisesrwanda2001.be/080603.html (translation from 
French by author). 
 184. Although Rekeraho was sentenced to death, Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007 and 
Rekeraho‘ sentence was commuted to life. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, art. 23 (2010), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf 
(―The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In determining the 
terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison 
sentences in the courts of Rwanda.‖). 
 185. Id. 
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is like an oasis in the desert. Arusha prison is the Rolls Royce of 
prisons.‖186 
After Rekeraho signed his statement in June 1999, Tremblay officially 
recommended that the ICTR ask the Rwandan government to suspend its 
case against Rekeraho.
187
 But the ICTR was uninterested in prosecuting 
Rekeraho, instead focusing on higher-ranking figures.
188
 As a result, the 
ICTR had little use for Rekeraho‘s statement, and it did not object when a 
Rwandan military tribunal proceeded to try Rekeraho.
189
 The military 
tribunal sentenced Rekeraho to death; his co-accused, also from Sovu, 
received a life sentence.
190
  
The news that the ICTR had decided to allow Rekeraho‘s case to 
proceed in the Rwandan courts came as a shock to Tremblay, and 
Rekeraho was incensed. When Tremblay went to visit him again in 
Rwanda, Rekeraho told him that if he was not transferred to Arusha, ―he 
would tell everyone that he lied, that he did not tell the truth‖ in his 
declaration against the Sisters.
191
 In a letter Rekeraho sent during the trial 
to investigative judge Damien Vandermeersch, Rekeraho called the 
allegations against Srs. Gertrude and Kizito ―pure lies.‖192 The Sisters 
were not willful participants in the genocide, as he had said before.
193
 No, 
they were ―truly innocent.‖194 He implored Judge Vandermeersch to 
disregard the accusations against the Sisters, writing that the accusations 
―sully my dignity and the innocent souls‖ of the Sisters.195 
 
 
 186. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Plaidoires de la défense: Défense 
de Consolata Mukangango (Alain Vergauwen), http://assisesrwanda2001.be/090404.html (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2012) (translation from French by author). 
 187. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Auditions des témoins: le témoin 
Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, http://assisesrwanda2001.be/080603.html (last visited Aug. 10, 
2012) (translation from French by author). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Auditorat Militaire Général contre Adjudant Chef Rekeraho et Caporal Kamanayo [Military 
Prosecutor v. Chief Officer Rekeraho and Corporal Kamanayo], RPA 0012/CM-CS/KGL/2000, 
November 15, 2000. See supra note 184; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Rwanda Lawmakers Vote to Scrap 
Death Penalty, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 9, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story 
.php?storyId=10910112. 
 191. Transcript of Record, Auditions des témoins: le témoin Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, 
supra note 181. 
 192. Letter from Emmanuel Rekeraho to Judge Damien Vandermeersch, May 5, 2001, supra note 
176 (on file with author). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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After the trial, Rekeraho continued to proclaim the innocence of the 
Sisters. In a letter he wrote to Srs. Gertrude and Kizito after the trial, 
Rekeraho claims that he told Judge Vandermeersch the ―unshakable 
truth‖—that Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were in fact innocent.196 When 
interviewed in 2007 in Karubanda Prison, Rekeraho remained adamant 
about the innocence of Sisters Gertrude and Kizito.
197
 A charismatic 
figure, Rekeraho claimed that the Sisters played no role at all in the 
genocide.
198
 ―They are accused of giving me gasoline to burn the garage. 
But I was a driver and I was the leader of the killings,‖ he reasoned.199 ―I 
would have had all the materials I needed.‖200 He added that he would not 
recognize Sr. Kizito if he saw her today. If he did not know Sr. Kizito, he 
reasoned, how could she have conspired with him to perpetrate the 
genocide?
201
  
Rekeraho has offered an array of explanations for his change of heart. 
In 2007, he explained, ―I gave false testimony implicating the Sisters 
because I was seriously tortured. Actually, they are innocent.‖202 In a letter 
to Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, Rekeraho claimed that Tremblay and his 
interpreter tried to bribe him with cigarettes and money.
203
 He also 
claimed that Tremblay offered him a deal in which his sons would be 
released from prison, his home and land would be returned to him, his 
family‘s security would be guaranteed, and he would be transferred to 
Arusha.
204
 Ultimately, Rekeraho explained, he gave in to the pressure. In 
the letter he wrote to the Sisters after their trial, he offered an apology: ―I 
humbly ask for your forgiveness for lying about you and consequently [for 
lying] to myself.‖205 
While Rekeraho wanted to testify in defense of the Sisters, the Belgian 
government refused to permit him to travel to Brussels. According to 
Vanderbeck, the Belgian government feared that Rekeraho would claim 
 
 
 196. Letter from Emmanuel Rekeraho to Damien Vandermeersch, Juge d‘Instruction, May 5, 
2005 (on file with author). 
 197. Interview with Emmanuel Rekeraho, Karubanda Prison, Butare, Rwanda (May 24, 2007). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. While human rights observers have documented deplorable prison conditions and 
instances of prisoner abuse in Rwanda, the author can neither confirm nor discredit Rekeraho‘s claim 
that he was tortured.  
 203. See Letter from Emmanuel Rekeraho to Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, at 4 (date unknown) (on 
file with author). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Letter from Emmanuel Rekeraho to Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, supra note 203. 
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political asylum if he were allowed into the country.
206
 Rekeraho implored 
the court to hear his testimony. ―If I can‘t be brought to Brussels to 
verbally testify, I ask that the court come here,‖ he wrote in a letter to the 
Sisters.
207
 He continued, ―I will then be able to tell [the court] what took 
place at the Sovu Monastery.‖208 Before the trial, Rekeraho had the 
opportunity to tell his new version of the story to Judge Vandermeersch 
when the judge travelled to Rwanda in March 2000.
209
 Rekeraho claims 
that he told Judge Vandermeersch the ―unshakable truth‖210—that Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito were innocent. 
Instead of hearing Rekeraho‘s testimony live in court, the court 
introduced the written statement that Rekeraho provided to the ICTR 
investigators and called Tremblay to testify.
211
 The statement and 
Tremblay‘s testimony proved highly damaging to the Sisters. According to 
Rekeraho‘s statement, Rekeraho coordinated closely with Srs. Gertrude 
and Kizito.
212
 Around April 7 or April 8, 1994, Sr. Gertrude provided 
Rekeraho the use of one of the health center‘s vehicles, ostensibly so that 
he would be able to arrive quickly should anyone try to attack the 
monastery.
213
 Srs. Gertrude and Kizito provided the gasoline used to 
incinerate the health center garage, but they did not carry it; rather, they 
followed a man by the name of Niondo, who carried two jerrycans.
214
 
After the first day of killings, soaked in blood, Rekeraho and two other 
local genocide leaders went into the monastery, where Sr. Kizito brought 
them soap and a towel to wash and served them milk and beer.
215
 Two 
days later, Sr. Gertrude paid Rekeraho 100,000 Rwandan francs to pay for 
the burial of those who had been murdered.
216
  
In the days after the April 22 massacre, according to Rekeraho‘s 
statement and Tremblay‘s testimony, Sr. Gertrude implored Rekeraho to 
take swift action to rid the monastery of the remaining refugees, but 
Rekeraho refused.
217
 Rekeraho saw himself as the protector of the 
 
 
 206. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, supra note 142, at 8. 
 207. See Letter from Emmanuel Rekeraho to Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, supra note 203, at 4. 
 208. See id.  
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 2. 
 211. Transcript of Record, Auditions des témoins: le témoin Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, 
supra note 181; Statement of Emmanuel Rekeraho to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
June 9, 1999 (copy on file with author). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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monastery, and he wanted to save the families of the nuns.
218
 The nuns and 
their families would never govern Rwanda, so he had no interest in killing 
them. Rekeraho also claims that he wanted to allow the Red Cross to set 
up tents in the monastery‘s courtyard, but Sr. Gertrude refused to allow 
it.
219
 These disagreements, and others, cooled the previously warm 
relationship between Sovu‘s mother superior and its chief executioner.220  
During Tremblay‘s testimony, the president of the court posed the 
question that must have been on everyone‘s mind: did the allure of a deal 
to bring Rekeraho to the ICTR ―induce him to make statements that did 
not correspond to reality?‖221 Tremblay responded by insisting that 
Rekeraho had given his statement voluntarily.
222
 But as discussed above, 
there are a number of reasons why Rekeraho may have been motivated to 
implicate the Sisters. The allure of being transferred to Arusha is one. 
Rekeraho also said in an interview for this Article that he was angry that 
Sr. Gertrude denied her role in the genocide and accused him of certain 
crimes that he claims he did not commit. Although Rekeraho is an 
enigmatic figure, his presence in court would have given the jury at least 
the opportunity to assess his credibility—a daunting but important task 
that is the crux of fact-finding. 
F. Verdict and Sentence 
In all, dozens of witnesses testified in court for and against the four co-
defendants and the President read an additional three witness statements 
aloud. Finally, the Sisters spoke: 
SR. GERTRUDE: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I 
wanted to save my community. Perhaps that was not the right thing 
to do, but I never wanted the massacres to take place. Rwanda was 
in chaos and in the context of total chaos, I had to make decisions in 
dealing with the militias. I may have made unwise decisions, but I 
never wanted the massacres. I have confidence in justice. Thank 
you . . . .
223
 
 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Transcript of Record, Auditions des témoins: le témoin Réjean Tremblay, ICTR investigator, 
supra note 181. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent Ntezimana, 
Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Conclusions des prévenus: 
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SR. KIZITO: Mr. President, judges, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. 
As a Sovu native and a woman of Hutu origins, I do not know how 
to respond to Sovu‘s widows, who were waiting for me to help 
them. I must live with that every day. Nonetheless, I never gave 
anything to the militias for ill. What I know is that my fellow nuns 
and I remained united, and I helped them as best I could during the 
three-month ordeal. Mr. President, judges, ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury, I have confidence in justice and I thank you.
224
 
Upon the conclusion of Sr. Kizito‘s statement, and before sending the jury 
to begin its deliberations, the president described the task awaiting the 
jury. ―Gather strength tonight,‖ he urged the jurors, ―so that you can 
endure what lies ahead tomorrow.‖225 
On June 8, 2001, after deliberating for eleven hours, the jury returned 
its verdict: guilty on all counts.
226
 Sr. Gertrude was sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison, while Sr. Kizito received a twelve year sentence.
227
 In 
response to the verdict, the Sisters reacted stoically. Sr. Gertrude declined 
to make a statement but courteously thanked the court for the opportunity 
to do so.
228
 Although she called the jury‘s verdict a ―lie,‖ Sr. Kizito 
reaffirmed her ―confidence in justice‖ and added that she would not ―lose 
her courage.‖229 To this day, Vanderbeck remains convinced that the 
Sisters ―were convicted as cowards, more than as killers. They were scared 
like hell,‖ he explains.230 ―They preferred to avoid helping people so that 
they could assure that they would stay alive.‖231 The late human rights 
activist and historian Alison Des Forges, who testified at the trial, 
responded to the verdict with a mix of approval and dissatisfaction: ―It‘s 
sad,‖ she said. ―The tragedy is that it‘s easy to convict nuns—but when are 
we ever going to get the people who were the brains behind it?‖232 A 
 
 
.be/090803.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (translation from French by author).  
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Assize Court of Brussels, verdict of 8 June 2001; see also Nuns jailed for genocide role, 
BBC (June 8, 2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1376692.stm. 
 227.  Nuns Jailed for Genocide Role, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2001, 17:20 GMT), http://news.bbc.co 
.uk/2/hi/europe/1376692.stm. 
 228. See generally Transcript of Record, Cour d‘assises de Bruxelles, Prosecutor v. Vincent 
Ntezimana, Alphonse Higaniro, Consolata Mukangango, Julienne Mukabutera, Conclusions des 
accusés: Consolata Mukangango, http://web.archive.org/web/20050228164002/http://www.assisesr 
wanda2001.be/110403.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (translation from French by author). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, supra note 142. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Keith B. Richburg, Rwandan Nuns Jailed in Genocide, WASH. POST (June 9, 2001), 
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Rwandan living in Belgium offered similar sentiments: ―It‘s justice. But 
it‘s just the beginning.‖233 
Consistent with standard Belgian procedure, whereby individuals serve 
only a fraction of their sentences, Srs. Gertrude and Kizito were released 
after serving half of their prison terms.
234
 Today, they are on conditional 
release at the monastery in Maredret, the same monastery where they lived 
after fleeing Rwanda.
235
 They are essentially under house arrest because 
they do not have permanent legal status in Belgium. As of September 
2010, Belgian immigration authorities were still deciding how to handle 
their case.
236
 Despite living in legal limbo, the Sisters enjoy a remarkable 
degree of freedom. Although Sr. Kizito seldom strays far from the 
monastery, Sr. Gertrude leaves frequently to attend university, where she 
is studying for a degree in law.
237
 
V. LESSONS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
Whether a trial has been successful depends on the definition of 
―success.‖ Different countries and cultures adhere to different ideas about 
justice. Should transnational trials respect the values of the country where 
the atrocities occurred? Should setting the goals of transitional justice be 
the sole prerogative of the nation in which the atrocities occurred, or 
should the international community play a role in deciding what goals to 
pursue? Once the decision is made to conduct trials, should they take place 
in the country where the atrocities occurred, in an international forum, or 
in the territory of a foreign state? Should procedural fairness, like western-
style due process protections for the accused, be elevated above other 
goals, such as punishing the guilty, promoting local reconciliation, or 
building domestic judicial capacity? Who should decide what goals are 
paramount and how to achieve them? This Part surveys the goals of 
transitional justice and explores the strengths and weakness of various 
types of trials. It goes on to evaluate the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito 
based on a variety of metrics.  
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 234. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, Defense Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium 
(Sept. 7, 2009). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Interview with Serge Wahis, Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium (Sept. 16, 2010). 
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(Sept. 7, 2009). 
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A. The Goals of Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice mechanisms aim to achieve an array of objectives, 
including sanctioning wrongdoing, making reliable determinations of 
guilt, individualizing guilt, ensuring fair trial standards are met, deterring 
future crimes, providing victim-centered justice, creating a historical 
record of past abuses, building national judicial capacity, strengthening 
respect for the rule of law, and contributing to long-term peace and 
reconciliation.
238
 
While some of these objectives can be achieved simultaneously, others 
may be mutually exclusive. For example, scholars like Payam Akhavan 
cautiously argue that international prosecutions for mass atrocity may 
deter future atrocities.
239
 Thus, in theory, the objectives of sanctioning 
wrongdoing and deterring future crimes would not be mutually exclusive; 
rather, trials would be the vehicle through which deterrence is achieved. 
But it is difficult to discern a cause and effect relationship between 
prosecutions and deterrence. Deterrence comes in two forms: specific and 
general. Specific deterrence prevents the accused from committing crimes 
in the future.
240
 This goal is readily attainable through criminal 
prosecutions and imprisonment. On the other hand, general deterrence—
where the threat of punishment discourages others from committing 
comparable crimes in the future—is more elusive for a variety of 
reasons.
241
 Although prosecutions have increased through the 
establishment of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, 
and the International Criminal Court, there remains a low risk of 
prosecution for mass atrocity.
242
 As a result, David Wippman argues that 
promoting general deterrence ―would seem to require far more than the 
occasional punishment of a particular offender.‖243 
Another important debate is whether transitional justice mechanisms 
form an obstacle to peace and stability.
244
 Jack Snyder and Leslie 
 
 
 238. This list is derived in part from Allen Weiner, Co-Director, Stanford Center on International 
Conflict and Negotiation, Lecture at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at 
Stanford University: Transitional Justice: Dealing with Past Abuses (Aug. 11, 2009). 
 239. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 7 (2001). For an overview of the debate on the deterrent capacity of 
international trials, see generally David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of 
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 473 (1999).  
 240. Weiner, supra note 238. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Wippman, supra note 239, at 486. 
 244. The so-called ―peace versus justice‖ debate was thrust to the fore again over the fate of 
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Vinjamuri argue that ―evidence from recent cases casts doubt on the 
claims that international trials deter future atrocities, contribute to 
consolidating the rule of law or democracy, or pave the way for peace.‖245 
Truth commissions, they argue, do little besides provide political cover for 
amnesties, which ―pave the way for peace.‖246 Indeed, conventional 
wisdom holds that a peaceful transition from apartheid to democratic 
governance in South Africa would have been impossible had the African 
National Congress insisted on criminal accountability.
247
 Writing about the 
aftermath of World War I, politics and international affairs professor Gary 
Bass argues that prosecution of lower-level accused at Leipzig ―made the 
Allies look vindictive and weak‖ and ―galvanized the German right and 
thus helped to undermine democracy in the Weimar Republic.‖248 But not 
all scholars agree that retributive justice, in the form of trials, are an 
obstacle to peace. After reviewing historical evidence, Kathryn Sikkink 
and Carrie Booth Walling concluded in an influential article that ―it 
remains hard to sustain in the face of this data that human rights trials 
actually lead to more atrocities.‖249 
In addition, international and transnational trials typically afford robust 
due process protections to the accused; however, because they 
purposefully sidestep national courts, they may not contribute to the 
development of domestic judicial capacity or promote norm penetration. 
Furthermore, international and transnational trials largely have failed to 
resonate with domestic audiences that do not understand the nature or 
 
 
former Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Making Tyrants Do Time, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/opinion/ 
making-tyrants-do-time.html; David Kaye, What to Do With Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at 
A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/ 01/opinion/what-to-do-with-qaddafi.html; Mark 
S. Ellis, Peace for All or Justice for One?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/12/opinion/12iht-edellis12.html?pagewanted=all. 
 245. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies 
of International Justice, 28 INT‘L SEC. 5, 20 (2003/2004). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. OF INT‘L AFFAIRS 647, 650 (1999) (―The former government and its 
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purpose of due process rights and that do not have ready access to news 
about the trials.
250
 
Thus, not all trials are created equally. International and transnational 
tribunals can make a number of contributions to post-genocide justice. 
Compared to the legal systems of countries in transition, international 
tribunals are more likely to have highly trained lawyers and judges who 
can resolve complex legal questions.
251
 International tribunals are also 
more likely to have the physical infrastructure and resources to carry out 
investigations and trials.
252
 In some cases, international tribunals may 
benefit from the perception, if not the reality, of impartiality because the 
court is not staffed by parties to the conflict.
253
 Finally, international 
tribunals may be more effective than domestic tribunals at obtaining 
physical custody over wanted persons.
254
 Yet international and 
transnational tribunals typically are physically and culturally distant from 
the country where the crimes took place, and they have suffered from a 
crisis of legitimacy.
255
 Rwandans might well wonder: What business does 
Belgium have adjudicating crimes committed in Rwanda when it has such 
a dubious record from the colonial period? What business does the UN 
have adjudicating crimes committed in Rwanda when it failed to act more 
decisively to prevent or halt the atrocities? 
By contrast, national trials are presumed to be accessible to the affected 
population for reasons of venue and language. Trying those responsible for 
atrocities in the country where the atrocities occurred can also build the 
capacity of the national justice system: judges, prosecutors, and defense 
attorneys will have to be trained; courthouses will have to be built; case 
management systems will have to be designed and implemented. But after 
large-scale violence, national justice systems are unlikely to be equipped 
to adjudicate large volumes of cases. It is also, perhaps, naïve to expect to 
build judicial capacity by trying some of the most complex, highly 
 
 
 250. See, e.g., Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, 
in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 
56 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (―The [ICTR] devotes only a very small portion of 
its budget to publicizing its work, leaving the task instead to organizations such as Internews . . . . In 
2002 the ICTR opened a center in the capital, Kigali, to disseminate information about the tribunal. 
Attractive to a tiny part of the urban elite, the center offers little to the majority of Rwandans, who are 
illiterate and live in rural areas.‖). 
 251. Neil Kritz, War Crimes Trials: Who Should Conduct Them—and How, in WAR CRIMES: THE 
LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 170 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Kritz, supra note 251, at 170. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Akhavan, supra note 239, at 25. 
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sensitive criminal cases. In some instances, including post-1994 Rwanda, 
it would have taken decades or more to build judicial capacity to the point 
where the courts could credibly process tens of thousands of cases.
256
 
Furthermore, national trials may suffer from a credibility gap if key 
populations do not regard the domestic justice system as impartial. 
At one point, local, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms were en 
vogue among some scholars of transitional justice. As Lars Waldorf 
observes, proponents of local justice have argued that ―after mass 
atrocities, restorative justice processes can promote accountability, 
deterrence, collective memory, truth, reconciliation, and the rule of law 
more successfully than international and national criminal trials.‖257 
Despite their promise, local legal mechanisms also suffer from a number 
of frailties: local trials tend to deny due process protections to the accused; 
they may inflame local tensions precisely because they are so proximate to 
the people who have been most directly affected by past violence; and if 
too tightly controlled by the state, they lose their character as 
decentralized, traditional forms of dispute resolution—the very source of 
their credibility.
258
 
Professor Laura Dickinson argues that hybrid courts, which blend 
elements of international and national justice, may promote capacity 
building and norm penetration more effectively than either international or 
national trials and may enjoy greater legitimacy in the eyes of the affected 
population.
259
 To date, however, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been met 
with decidedly mixed reviews.
260
 Hybrid courts have struggled to secure 
sufficient resources and ensure proper coordination between the national 
and international components.
261
 Hybrid tribunals also face the difficult 
task of establishing a body of procedural and substantive law.
262
  
 
 
 256. Peter Uvin, Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community 
in Rwanda After the Genocide, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 177, 183 (2001). 
 257. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity? Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 16 (2006). 
 258. See, e.g., id. at 85–86; Rettig, supra note 171, at 25. 
 259. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 295–96 (2003). 
 260. See, e.g., THIERRY CRUVELLIER, FROM THE TAYLOR TRIAL TO A LASTING LEGACY: PUTTING 
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 261. Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice, 41 INT‘L L. & 
POL. 1013, 1044–52 (2009). 
 262. Id. at 1044. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] TRANSNATIONAL TRIALS AS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  407 
 
 
 
 
B. Evaluating the Trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito 
In the wake of mass atrocity, there is no panacea. To devise the most 
effective legal response as part of a country‘s transition to peace and 
stability, policymakers must carefully consider their objectives and, from 
the array of possibilities, identify the response that is best suited to 
achieving those objectives. This Section examines the choices that were 
made in prosecuting Srs. Gertrude and Kizito in Belgium and evaluates 
how well the trial achieved various objectives. 
1. Sanctioning Wrongdoing 
In the wake of mass atrocity, a threshold determination is whether to 
prosecute, establish a truth commission, grant amnesty, pursue an 
alternative form of transitional justice, or do nothing. As discussed in the 
previous Section, each of these modes of transitional justice has certain 
strengths and weaknesses. Many countries have chosen to eschew 
prosecution, at least in the short term, to preserve stability. Rwanda, 
however, has chosen a different path. Since 1994, the Rwandan 
government has aggressively prosecuted alleged perpetrators from the 
political and military leadership to low-level perpetrators accused of 
pillaging.
263
 The gacaca courts alone have heard more than one million 
cases.
264
 In this respect, Belgium‘s decision to prosecute the Sisters was 
consistent with Rwanda‘s own emphasis on prosecution. Assuming that 
the jury accurately adjudged the guilt of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, the trial 
succeeded in sanctioning wrongdoing. 
2. Due Process  
Closely related to the decision to prosecute is the question of which 
authority should prosecute. European and North American nations have 
come to loggerheads with Rwanda over this question. Rwanda has pushed 
aggressively for European and North American countries to arrest and 
extradite suspected génocidaires found in their territory.
265
 In the case of 
 
 
 263. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity? Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2006). 
 264. 1994 Genocide: Gacaca Trials Discharge One Million Cases So Far, HIRONDELLE NEWS 
AGENCY (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/12200/1192/. The number of 
cases should be distinguished from the number of individuals tried by the gacaca courts. A single 
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Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, prosecution by the Rwandan authorities was 
never seriously considered because Rwanda and Belgium have never had 
an extradition treaty.
266
 In any event, until recently, Rwanda‘s extradition 
requests had generally been refused because of questions about the 
impartiality of Rwanda‘s justice system.267 A 2008 Human Rights Watch 
report on Rwanda‘s legal system notes the ―susceptibility of judges to 
pressure from members of the executive branch and other powerful 
persons, and the failure to assure basic fair trial standards—including the 
presumption of innocence, the right to present witnesses in one‘s own 
defense, and the right to protection from double jeopardy.‖268 In light of 
 
 
widow of President Habyarimana, who is widely suspected of leading the cabal of extremists who 
orchestrated the genocide. The arrest came on the heels of President Sarkozy‘s visit to Rwanda, a trip 
that signaled the healing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. See Marlise Simons, 
France: Widow of a Rwandan Leader is Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at A6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/03/world/europe/03briefs-France.html?scp=1&sq=agathe%20hab 
yarimana&st=cse. In late September 2011, a French appeals court rejected the extradition request. See 
Marlise Simons, Rwanda: France Refuses to Extradite President’s Widow, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/africa/rwanda-france-refuses-to-
extradite-presidents-widow.html?scp=1&sq=habyarimana &st=cse. Just last year, the European Court 
of Human Rights determined that Sweden could extradite a Rwandan national to Rwanda for trial, 
notwithstanding the Rwandan national‘s assertions that he would not receive a fair trial in Rwanda. 
See Ahorugeze v. Sweden (No. 37075/09), HUDOC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/ 
pages/search.aspx?i=001-107183. 
 266. However, by becoming a party to the Convention Against Torture, Rwanda could have 
triggered Article 8(2), which provides: ―If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no 
extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such 
offenses.‖ Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 8, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. But 
Rwanda did not ratify the Convention Against Torture, making this potential basis for extradition 
unavailable. Interview with Damien Vandermeersch, supra note 114. 
 267. See, e.g., Thijs Bouwknegt, Rwanda Ex-Pastor Faces Genocide Charges in Finland, RADIO 
NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/rwanda-
ex-pastor-faces-genocide-charges-finland (discussing a Finnish court‘s refusal to extradite Francois 
Bazaramba, a pastor accused of orchestrating the massacre of as many as 5000 Tutsi); France Refuses 
to Extradite Rwanda Genocide Suspect, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www 
.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gM8WyIVq9j5WrljTfqo_464kg4Fg (noting a French 
court‘s refusal to extradite a Rwandan doctor wanted for genocide crimes); Sweden Stops Extradition 
of Rwanda Genocide Suspect, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (July 16, 2009), http://www.google 
.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i-2X4PpngZoIZJiLHB2xoh_bDemQ (reporting the Swedish 
government‘s decision to delay the extradition of a Rwandan genocide suspect, Sylvère Ahorugeze, 
upon a request by the European Court of Human Rights). After a lengthy analysis of Rwanda‘s judicial 
system, in October 2011 the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision holding that 
extraditing Ahorugeze to Rwanda for trial would not violate the European Convention on Human 
Rights. See Ahorugeze v. Sweden (No. 37075/09), HUDOC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107183 
 268. Rwanda: Progress in Judicial Reforms Fall Short: Technical Advances, but Insufficient Fair 
Trial Guarantees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 25, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/07/23/ 
rwanda-progress-judicial-reforms-falls-short. The full report is available at Law and Reality: Progress 
in Judicial Reform in Rwanda, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 24, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] TRANSNATIONAL TRIALS AS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  409 
 
 
 
 
these observations, due process rights may have been compromised had 
the Sisters been tried in Rwanda.  
Of course, while due process rights form the bedrock of European and 
North American legal systems, robustly protecting due process rights may 
come at the expense of other goals. For example, when Rwanda launched 
the gacaca courts, it consciously decided not to prioritize western-style 
procedural protections, such as the right to defense counsel.
269
 While this 
decision has been the subject of considerable debate, it was made, at least 
in part, out of necessity. Rwanda‘s legal system was decimated after the 
genocide. If it had submitted all genocide cases to prosecution in the 
ordinary court system, with the complete set of due process protections, 
the trials would have continued for decades.  
3. Local Engagement  
Another consequence of prosecuting Srs. Gertrude and Kizito in 
Belgium is a remarkable lack of engagement with the people of Sovu. 
Although the saga of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito generated significant media 
attention both in Belgium and abroad, and although witnesses traveled 
from Sovu to testify in Belgium, Sovu residents do not appear to have 
followed the trial closely.  
This lack of engagement is evidenced in the responses that Sovu 
residents gave to questions about the trial. In public opinion polls, over 
85% of Sovu residents said they were ―not well-informed‖ or ―not 
informed‖ about the landmark trial.270 Only 20% of residents said that they 
had heard radio reports about the trial, while 33% said that they received 
news about the trial from neighbors; fewer than 10% of respondents could 
correctly state the verdict.
271
  
Perhaps as a result, the majority of Sovu residents expressed 
uncertainty in response to a series of questions about the impact of the trial 
on the community. Nearly half of respondents (46%) were uncertain as to 
whether the trial had functioned well. ―Uncertain‖ also was the most 
 
 
62097/section/1. 
 269. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA‘S COMMUNITY-
BASED COURTS 27–31 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda 
0511webwcover_0.pdf. 
 270. The public opinion polls were conducted by the author. See discussion supra Part II. The 
2007 survey indicated that 88% of the Sovu residents said they were ―not well-informed‖ or ―not 
informed.‖ Data of the anonymous surveys is on file with the author. 
 271. The public opinion polls were conducted by the author. Data of anonymous survey is on file 
with the author. 
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common response to questions about the trial‘s impact on local 
reconciliation (49%), whether the trial was fair to all groups (62%), and 
whether the punishments handed down were fair compared to the 
sentences at gacaca (62%).
272
 When asked whether the trial in Belgium 
has contributed to reconciliation in Sovu, nearly 50% of Sovu residents 
replied that they were ―uncertain‖ while 39% replied affirmatively.273 
With a concerted effort to reach out to the people of Sovu, the trial 
might have had a more significant impact on the community.
274
 After all, 
Sovu residents overwhelmingly expressed the desire to know more about 
the trial (more than 80%).
275
 For example, allowing the Rwandan 
authorities to prosecute the case—or play a role in the prosecution, 
perhaps in partnership with the Belgian authorities, in a kind of hybrid 
tribunal—may have strengthened Rwanda‘s own legal system and 
contributed to an understanding of the importance of due process.
276
 
Belgian authorities could have arranged for the trial to be publicized or 
even broadcast in Sovu. Court representatives could have been sent to 
Sovu to explain the proceedings to the public. While these are not typical 
functions of domestic criminal justice systems, transnational trials are not 
typical trials.  
 
 
 272.  The public opinion polls were conducted by the author. Data of anonymous survey is on file 
with the author. For an in-depth discussion of gacaca and its impact in Sovu, see Rettig, supra note 
171, at 25. 
 273. The public opinion polls were conducted by the author. Data of anonymous survey is on file 
with the author. 
 274. Jessica Feinstein argues that the Special Court for Sierra Leone ―succeeded in its relations 
with local media where past international criminal courts have failed, largely through the early creation 
of proactive outreach and public affairs sections.‖ Jessica Feinstein, The Hybrid’s Handmaiden: Media 
Coverage of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 LOY. UNIV. CHI. INT‘L L. REV. 131, 133 (2009). 
 275. The public opinion polls were conducted by the author. Data of anonymous survey is on file 
with the author. Of course, whether enhanced engagement would have had any affect at all on the 
community, and whether any impact would have been positive or negative, is unclear.  
 276. Along these lines, David Kaye recently suggested that the International Criminal Court 
should be allowed to prosecute Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. He argues that the trial ―would be 
closer to the communities that most need to see justice done. It could involve more Libyans in the 
proceedings, a step that would afford the ICC greater access to victims and give young Libyan lawyers 
and other professionals experience with a modern system of justice. It would give the ICC‘s staff 
members an opportunity to engage directly with the society for which they are doing their work, while 
serving as a platform for the international community to help Libya rebuild the rule of law. Trial in 
Tripoli, with significant Libyan participation, could also signal a new direction for Libya, one that 
favors the rule of law and integration with the institutions of international life. It could foster criminal 
prosecutions of lower-level perpetrators and truth-and-reconciliation processes at the national level, as 
well as investigations of any serious crimes committed by rebel forces, a signal that the new 
government believes in fairness within a unified society.‖ What to Do With Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/opinion/what-to-do-with-qaddafi.html. 
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4. Rehabilitation and Reconciliation 
Where a trial takes place is closely linked to the severity of the 
sentence an accused is eligible to receive. For example, handing down the 
death penalty or a life sentence sends a strong message about the 
individual‘s culpability and the gravity of the crime. On the other hand, a 
shorter sentence, or a sentence that combines a prison sentence with 
community service, as is sometimes the case with gacaca, may be more 
conducive to reintegration and reconciliation.
277
  
The fact that the Sisters have been released after serving only a handful 
of years in prison raises an important question about whether the trial 
comported with Rwanda‘s priorities for transitional justice. Compared to 
the sentences handed down by Rwanda‘s military and domestic courts, 
gacaca, and even the ICTR, the nuns received extraordinarily light 
sentences. Under Belgian law, prisoners generally serve only one-third of 
their sentence.
278
 The nuns served closer to half of their sentences because 
Belgium struggled to decide what to do with the nuns upon their release. 
For legal and political reasons, they could not be allowed to walk free in 
Belgium.
279
 In contrast to Belgian law, Rwanda‘s domestic courts initially 
sentenced the worst offenders to death; since Rwanda abolished the death 
penalty, death sentences have been commuted to life. Rekeraho and 
Kamanayo, tried before a military tribunal, will spend the rest of their 
lives in prison. Even the gacaca courts have the power to hand down life 
sentences for leaders of the genocide and individuals accused of 
committing rape or sexual torture.
280
 Although gacaca rewards those who 
confess with reduced prison terms, judges routinely deem confessions 
 
 
 277. John Braithwaite argues that, in certain societies, ―sanctions imposed by relatives, friends or 
a personally relevant collectively have more effect on criminal behavior than sanctions imposed by a 
remote legal authority.‖ JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 69 (1989). Mark 
Drumbl has argued that ―restorative justice initiatives may be more effective in promoting 
accountability for mass violence that was not perceived as deviant at the time and may still not be 
universally perceived as deviant after the fact.‖ Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt 
to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1232 (2000). 
 278. Interview with Gilles Vanderbeck, Defense Attorney for Sr. Kizito, in Brussels, Belgium 
(Sept. 7, 2009). 
 279. They were ineligible to seek political asylum in Belgium because they had been convicted of 
breaching the Geneva Conventions, and the Belgian government also refused to allow them to remain 
under a law intended for persons with strong links to the country. But they also could not be returned 
to Rwanda. Belgium was concerned about how they would be treated there. Interview with Serge 
Wahis, September 2010. Serge Wahis, co-counsel for Sr. Kizito, predicted that if the Sisters returned 
to Rwanda, they would disappear and would never be heard from again. Interview with Alain 
Vergauwen and Serge Wahis, Defense Attorneys for Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, in Brussels, Belg. (Sept. 
8, 2009) (translated from French by author). 
 280. See Rettig, supra note 171, at 31.  
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incomplete and impose prison terms of twenty-five years for individuals 
who killed two or three people;
281
 these are ―ordinary‖ killers in a place 
where thousands of people were massacred in the span of days in Sovu 
alone. The ICTR has earned a reputation for handing down light sentences. 
Yet even regional leaders like Aloys Simba, Rekeraho‘s immediate 
superior, received a twenty-five year sentence.
282
 
The differential in sentences may have been justified if the crimes Srs. 
Gertrude and Kizito committed were not as grave as those committed by 
the likes of Rekeraho, Kamanayo, and Simba. But if Srs. Gertrude and 
Kizito did in fact cooperate with local genocide leaders and provide the 
gasoline used to burn the health center, they share responsibility for the 
deaths of as many as 500 people. A Rwandan court almost certainly would 
have sentenced the Sisters to death or life imprisonment. 
5. Summary 
Judged against concrete metrics, the trial succeeded in certain respects 
and failed in others. Srs. Gertrude and Kitizo were subjected to a trial in 
accordance with the rule of law and, notwithstanding questions about 
whether Rekeraho should have testified in court, they enjoyed robust due 
process protections. A jury of laypersons found them guilty, and they were 
punished not because of their ethnicity, but because of their acts. However, 
the trial failed to capture the attention of the people of Sovu, which may 
have diminished its contributions to such goals as reconciliation and norm 
penetration. The transcripts and exhibits left behind contribute to the 
historical record of the Rwandan genocide and how it was perpetrated in 
Sovu, but this record is more easily accessible to western researchers with 
speedy internet connections and the ability to travel to Brussels than it is to 
Sovu residents, who often lack electricity, let alone computers. Moreover, 
it is difficult to assess the trial‘s performance in other fundamentally 
important areas. Establishing the rule of law, deterring future crimes, and 
reconstructing social trust are vital to a community‘s long-term security 
and stability, but they are infamously difficult to measure.  
 
 
 281. Based on statistics collected during fieldwork in Sovu between August 2006 and July 2007. 
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.aspx. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The trial and conviction of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito, the first under 
Belgium‘s universal jurisdiction law, broke new ground in international 
criminal justice. It also raised awareness around the world of the power of 
universal jurisdiction. In their post-mortem on the law after its repeal in 
2003, following the indictment of several senior American political and 
military figures, several NGOs heralded the law for ―help[ing] destroy the 
wall of impunity behind which the world‘s tyrants had always hidden to 
shield themselves from justice.‖283 They lamented that ―Belgium has now 
forgotten the victims to whom it gave a hope of justice.‖284 
But what does ―justice‖ mean? If Srs. Gertrude and Kizito had been 
extradited to and tried in Rwanda, they would have received a much stiffer 
sentence than they did before the Belgian courts. Furthermore, if the trial 
had taken place in Sovu or even in Butare, Sovu residents would have had 
the opportunity to attend the trial; they would have heard widows tell their 
story of loss and survival; they would have seen Rekeraho, dressed in 
prison pink, testify about his relationship with the nuns. Perhaps that 
outcome would have been more just in the eyes of survivors. 
Asked to reflect on the role of transnational trials in transitional justice, 
defense attorney Vanderbeck responded: ―I‘m not convinced 
[transnational trials are] a good way to do justice.‖285 He continued, ―It‘s 
hard to export justice and to ask some other people to be the judge of what 
happened in Rwanda. And on the other hand, it‘s hard for Rwandans to 
[deliver] justice because they were involved in the conflict.‖286  
Vanderbeck‘s ambivalence reflects the tradeoffs that were implicit in 
the trial of Srs. Gertrude and Kizito. Transnational trials promote 
accountability, contribute to the fight against impunity, and uphold liberal 
judicial norms. Perhaps over time, they may even have a deterrent effect 
on future crimes. But transnational trials are distant—physically and 
culturally—from the people in whose name justice is done. Foreign judges 
and juries may not be ideally placed to judge crimes committed in far off 
lands. Key witnesses may not be available to testify, and transnational 
trials do little to build domestic judicial capacity and connect with the 
affected population. It is only by accounting for the numerous and 
 
 
 283. Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 1, 2003), 
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sometimes competing goals of transitional justice that the impact of 
transnational trials can truly be measured. 
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